Magistri Petri Lombardi
Arch. Episc. Parisiensis

Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

DISTINCTIO XXI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 377-378.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Cap. I.

Quomodo possit dici: solus Pater vel solus Filius vel solus Spiritus sanctus, cum sint inseparabiles.

Hic oritur quaestio trahens originem ex praedictis. Dictum est enim supra,[1] quod tantus est solus Pater vel solus Filius vel solus Spiritus sanctus, quantum simul illi tres, et quod duae vel tres personae simul non sunt maius aliquid quam una sola. Ideo quaerit Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate:[2] « Quomodo haec sane dici possint, cum nec Pater sit solus nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, sed semper et inseparabiliter et Filius cum Patre et Pater cum Filio et Spiritus sanctus cum utroque; inseparabiles enim sunt hae tres personae ». Ad quod ita respondet Augustinus in eodem:[3] « Solum Patrem dicimus Patrem, non quia separatur a Filio vel a Spiritu sancto, sed hoc dicentes significamus, quia illi simul cum eo non sunt Pater ». Solus enim Pater Pater est. Quod non dicitur, quia ipse sit solus, id est sine Filio vel Spiritu sancto, sed per hoc Filius et Spiritus sanctus a paternitatis consortio excluduntur. Ita et cum dicitur: solus Filius Filius est, vel solus Spiritus sanctus Spiritus sanctus est, non dividitur Filius a Patre vel Spiritus sanctus ab utroque, sed a consortio filialis proprietatis excluduntur Pater et Spiritus sancuts, et a consortio processibilis proprietatis Pater et Filius. Cum ergo dicitur: tantus est solus Pater, quantum simul illi tres, per hoc quod dicitur *solus* non separatur Pater ab aliis, sed hic est sensus:

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 21

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 377-378.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Chapter I.

In what manner can there be said: 'the Father alone', and/or 'the Son alone' and/or 'the Holy Spirit alone', since They are inseparable*.

Here arises the question, drawing its origin from the aforesaid. For it has been said above,[1] that as much as is the Father alone [solus] and/or the Son alone and/or the Holy Spirit alone, so much (are) those Three together, and that Two and/or Three Persons together are not something more than One alone. For that reason (St.) Augustine ask in the sixth book On the Trinity:[2] « In what manner can these be sanely said, since neither is the Father alone, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, but always and inseparably (is) both the Son with the Father and the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit with Each; for these Three Persons are inseparable ». To which (St.) Augustine responds thus, in the same book:[3] « We say that the Father alone (is) the Father, not because He is separated from the Son and/or from the Holy Spirit, but saying this we signify, that Those together with Him are not the Father ». For the Father alone is the Father. Which is not said, because He Himself is alone, that is without the Son and/or the Holy Spirit, but through this the Son and the Holy Spirit are excluded from a share in the paternity [a paternitatis consortio]. Thus too when there is said: 'the Son alone is the Son', and/or 'the Holy Spirit alone is the Holy Spirit', the Son is not divided from the Father and/or the Holy Spirit from Each, but the Father

solus Pater, id est Pater, quia ita Pater est, quod nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, tantus est etc.[4] Similiter intellige, cum dicitur: solus est Filius vel solus est Spiritus Sanctus. « Solus ergo Pater dicitur, ut ait Augustinus in eodem,[5] quia non nisi ipse ibi Pater est », et solus Filius, quia non nisi ipse ibi Filius est, et solus Spiritus sanctus, quia non nisi ipse ibi Spiritus sanctus est.

and the Holy Spirit are excluded from a share in the property of the Son [filialis], and the Father and the Son from a share in the property of the procession [processibilis]. Since, therefore, there is said: 'as much as is the Father alone, so much those Three together', through that which He is said (to be) "*alone*", the Father is not separated from the Others, but this is the sense: 'the Father alone, that is, the Father, because thus is He the Father, because neither is the Son nor the Holy Spirit as much (as those Three).[4] Similarly understand, when there is said: 'He alone is the Son' and/or 'He alone is the Holy Spirit'. « Therefore He alone is said (to be) the Father », as (St.) Augustine says in the same,[5] « because naught but He is the Father There », and He alone the Son, because naught but He is the Son There, and He alone the Holy Spirit, because naught but He is the Holy Spirit there.

Cap. II.

Utrum debeat dici: solus Pater est Deus, vel solus Filius est Deus, vel solus Spiritus sanctus est Deus; an, Pater est solus Deus, Filius est solus Deus, Spiritus est solus Deus.

Post hoc quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur: solus Pater est Pater, vel solus Filius est Filius, ita possit dici: solus Pater est Deus, vel solus Filius est Deus, ita et de Spiritu sancto; aut, Pater est solus Deus, Filius est solus Deus. Ad quod dicimus, quia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus dicitur et est unus Deus, et haec Trinitas simul proprie dicitur esse solus Deus, sicut solus sapiens, solus potens. Sed non videtur debere dici a nobis verbis nostris utentibus, nisi ubi sermo auctoritatis[6] occurit: solus Pater est Deus, vel Pater est solus Deus; ita de Filio et Spiritu sancto dicimus. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate[7] ait: « Quoniam ostendimus, quomodo possit dici solus Pater vel solus Filius, consideranda est illa sententia, qua dicitur, Deum verum solum non esse Patrem solum, sed Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ». Ecce habes, quia non solus Pater dicendus est esse solus verus Deus. Item in eodem:[8] « Si quis interroget, utrum Pater solus sit Deus; quomodo respondebimus, non esse, nisi forte ita dicamus, esse quidem Patrem

Chapter II.

Whether there ought to be said: 'the Father alone is God', and/or 'the Son alone is God', and/or 'the Holy Spirit alone is God'; or whether, 'the Father is the only God', 'the Son is the only God', 'the Holy Spirit is the only God'.

After this, there is asked, whether, just as there is said: 'the Father alone is the Father', and/or 'the Son alone is the Son', it can thus be said: 'the Father alone is God', and/or 'the Son alone is God', thus also of the Holy Spirit; or, 'the Father is the only God' [solus Deus], 'the Son is the only God'. To which we say, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is said (to be) and is the One God, and this Trinity together is properly said to be the only God, just as 'the only Wise One', 'the only Powerful One'. But it does not seem that by us, using our own words, there ought to be said: 'the Father alone is God', and/or 'the Father is alone God', except where the discourse of an authority[6] occurs; and thus do we speak of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity[7] says: « Since we have shown, in what manner there can be said 'the Father alone' and/or 'the Son alone', there must be considered that sentence, by which there is said, that the True God is not only the Father, but the Father and the Son and the

Deum, sed non eum esse solum Deum? Esse autem solum Deum dicamus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ». Ecce et hic habes, quia Pater non debet dici solus Deus; atque hic[9] *solum* in parte subiecti tantum accipere quidam volunt, in parte vero praedicati si sit, concedunt, quod Pater est solus Deus. Sed ex verbis Augustini videtur ostendi, quod proprie solus Deus dici debeat tota Trinitas. Et haec Trinitas, ut ait Augustinus contra Maximinum,[10] intelligitur, cum Apostolus dicit: *Beatus et solus potens*; et ibi: *Soli sapienti Deo*; et ibi: *Invisibili soli . . .*

Holy Spirit ». Behold, you have, that not only the Father is to be said to be the only True God. Likewise in the same:[8] « If anyone questions, whether the Father alone is God; in what manner shall we respond, that He is not, except perhaps we speak thus, that indeed the Father is God, but that He is not the only God [solus Deus]? But we do say that the only God [solus Deus] is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit ». Behold you also have here, that the Father ought not be said to be the only God [solus Deus]; and certain ones want to accept, here (in the text of St. Augustine),[9] solus in the part of the subject (i.e. as 'the Father is not alone God'), however, if it is in the part of the predicate, they do concede, that the Father is the only God. But from the words of (St.) Augustine it seems to be shown, that properly the only God ought to be said to be the whole Trinity. And this Trinity, as (St.) Augustine says Against Maximinus,[10] is understood, when the Apostle says: *the blessed and only Powerful One*, and there (where he says): *To the only wise God*; and there (where he says): *To the invisible, the only . . .*

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[1] Dist. XIX. — Mox solummodo Vat. et ed. 4 *illae tres*; supple: *personae*. Deinde Vat. cum paucis edd. post *una* superflue addit *personam*.
[2] Cap. 7. n. 9, secundum sensum; Magister extendit quaestionem etiam ad Spiritum sanctum, sicut et in sequente textu.
[3] Ibid., paucis interpositis. — In principio edd. praeter Vat. et ed. 1 male et contra codd. et originale legunt: *Solum Deum Patrem dicimus, non quia*.
[4] Supple cum codd. A C: *quantum illi tres*.
[5] Cap. 9. n. 10.
[6] Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 7 non bene *auctoritatibus*.
[7] Cap. 9. n. 10; in quo textu Vat. et aliae edd. contra 1, 8, codd. et originale male legunt *posset* pro *possit*. Finito textu, ante *verus Deus* Vat. et plures edd. contra codd. male omittunt *solus*.
[8] Loc. cit. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6 *interrogat*, contradicentibus aliis edd., codd. et Augustino. Deinde post *sed non* sola Vat. omittit *eum*.
[9] Edd. 2, 3, 7, 9 *hoc*; ed. 6 *hic solus*. In qualicumque lectione verba Magisteri ob brevitatem sunt subobscura. Lectionem *hic* sic interpretari possumus: *hic*, id est in hac resolutione negativa, aliqui distinguunt, admittentes eam, si verbum *solum* ex parte subiecti accipitur. Similiter etiam lectio *hoc* fortasse intelligi postest. De ipsa sententia Magistri cfr. S. Bonaventura, hic dub. 1. — Mox Vat. et ed. 4 post *praedicati* non bene legunt *sic*, et edd. 3, 7 peius *si sic*.
[10] Libr. II. c. 12. n. 2. Magister ex hoc et tribus sequen- / -tibus . . .

* [Trans. note: In this distinction the single Latin word *solus* is rendered in English with 2 distinct adverbial expressions: *alone* and *the only*, the former which is used always after the noun is modifies, whether this is immediately after, or on the other side of the copula, as in the sentence, "The Father is alone God"; the latter which always precedes the noun it modifies, as in the phrase "the only God". This same Latin word could be rendered into English with the cognate *sole* in most usages, or with *lone* in some usages; but to clearly distinguish and to remove all confusion in English, the other two English adverbials have been employed in the text; furthermore the disparate senses of *alone* and *only* used in this English translation follows that reckoning confirmed by St. Bonaventure in his Commentaria on this Distinction, q. v., except wherein Master Peter reads Augustine in the contrary sense. — The rationale for the diverse uses of *alone* and *the only* in the translation is this: *alone* is used whenever solus has the sense of *solitary* and/or *considered by itself*; *the only* is used whenever solus has the sense of *numerical exclusion*; each is rendered according to what senses are allowed by the Catholic Faith: thus at the beginning of Chapter II, first *alone* is used, and then *the only*, on account of the argument which follows, regarding the unicity of God. Then *alone* is used, because inasmuch as it signifies *solitary* and *considered by itself* it comprises the uneasiness of an expression that would refer the name "God" to the "Father", contradistinguished with the expression

that the Trinity is *the only True God*, which would not occur if their sense were the same, as clearly the argument uses the second sense to expound the first. Likewise, in the quote of St. Augustine which follows footnote 8, the first *the only God* is rendered in parallel with the second, without which similarity the argument would not be coherent; and without which the argument of Master Peter, which follows, would not be founded on the text. The other usages of *the only* follow the same sense taken in the first usages on the basis of the argument Master Peter first advances; presuming that it was his intention to read this sense always in similar expressions. As will be seen in St. Bonaventure's Commentary, he judges Master Peter's argument after the quote which follows footnote 8, based on a faulty reading, and holds that Augustine should be read in the middle sentence *the Father is not alone God*. The Seraphic Doctor also judges in dubium 1 of this distinction, that « Master (Peter) does not say, that the Father is not the only God, but that He is not properly said (to be the only God) ».]

[1] Distinction XIX. — Next only the Vatican edition and edition 4 read *those Three* [illae tres]; supply *Persons* [personae]. Then the Vatican edition, together with a few editions, reads *than one Person alone* [una persona sola].

[2] Chapter 7, n. 9, according to its sense; Master (Peter) extends the question even to the Holy Spirit, just as in the following text.

[3] Ibid., with a few (words) interposed. — At the beginning the editions, besides the Vatican edition and edition 1, badly and contrary to the codices and original, read: *We say that the only God (is) the Father, not because* [Solum Deum Patrem dicimus, non quia].

[4] Supply with codices A and C: *as much as those Three* [quantum illis tres].

[5] Chapter 9, n. 10.

[6] The Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, and 7, reads not well *on authorities* [auctoritatibus] for *of an authority* [auctoritatis]. [Trans. note: there *authority* is used in the sense of "a quote from a Pope, Doctor, Father, Saint etc."]

[7] Chapter 9, n. 10; in which text the Vatican edition and the other editions, contrary to edition 1 and 8, the codices and the original, read badly *there could* [posset] for *there can* [possit]. With the text finished, before *True God* [verus Deus], the Vatican edition and very many editions, contrary to the codices, badly omit *the only* [solus].

[8] Loc. cit.. — The Vatican edition, and editions 4 and 6, have the indicative *questions* [interrogat] for the subjunctive *questions* [interroget], with the other editions, the codices, and (St.) Augustine, contradicting this. Then after *but that* [sed] the Vatican edition alone reads *there is not a sole God* [non esse solum Deum].

[9] Editions 2, 3, 7 and 9 read *this (word)* [hoc] for *here (in the text of St. Augustine)* [hic]; and edition 6 reads "*solus*" [solus] for *solus* [solum]. In each whatever reading the words of Master (Peter) are somewhat obscure. We can interpret the reading of "*here*" [hic] in this manner: "*here*", that is in this

negative resolution (of the argument), some distinguish, admitting it, if the word "*solus*" is accepted on the part of the subject (i. e. "the Father is alone God"). Similarly also can be understood the reading of "*this (word)*" [hoc]. On this sentence of Master (Peter), cf. St. Bonaventure, here in dubium 1. — Next the Vatican edition and edition 4 read *thus* [sic] for *if it is* [si sit], and edition 3 and 7 read worse *if thus* [si sic].

[10] Book II, ch. 12, n. 2. Master (Peter) from this and the next three following . . . [Trans. note: this footnote continues on next page.]

Deo. Non enim de solo Patre haec accipienda sunt, ut contendebat Maximinus et alii haeretici, sed de Trinitate. Sicut et illud: *Solus habet immortalitatem*, quia secundum rectam fidem ipsa Trinitas est unus solus Deus, beatus, potens, sapiens, invisibilis. Unde Augustinus in eodem:[1] «Cum unus Deus sit Trinitas, haec sit nobis solutio quaestionis, ut intelligamus solum Deum sapientem, solum potentem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, qui est unus et solus Deus ».

God. For not of the Father alone are these to be accepted, as Maximinus use to contend and the other heretics (too), but of the Trinity. Just as also that (verse): *He alone has immortality*, because according to the right Faith, the Trinity Itself is the one, only God, the Blessed One, the Powerful One, the Wise One, the Invisible One. Whence (St.) Augustine in the same (book says): « Since the one God is the Trinity, this is for us the solution to the question, that we understand that the only wise, the only powerful God (is) the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, who is the one and only God ».

Cap. III.

Quomodo Trinitas dicatur solus Deus, cum ipsa sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis.

Sed iterum quaeritur, quomodo ipsam Trinitatem dicimus solum Deum, cum sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis. Ad quod respondet Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate[2] ita dicens: « Trinitatem dicimus Deum solum, quamvis semper sit cum spiritibus et animabus sanctis, sed *solum* dicimus, quia non aliud quam ipsa Trinitas Deus est. Non enim illi cum illa Deus sunt », vel aliqua alia, sed ipsa Trinitas tantum, non illi vel alia Deus est.

« Verumtamen, ut ait Augustinus,[3] etsi de solo Patre praedicta dicerentur, non tamen excluderetur Filius vel Spiritus sanctus, quia *hi tres unum sunt*; sicut in Apocalypsi de Filio legitur, quod *habet nomen scriptum, quod nemo scit nisi ipse*. Non enim inde separatur Pater vel Spiritus sanctus. Et cum dicitur: *Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filius*; non

Chapter III

In what manner is the Trinity said (to be) God alone, since He is with the spirits and the souls.

But again there is asked, in what manner do we say that the Trinity itself is God alone, since He is with the spirits and the holy souls. To which (St.) Augustine responds in the sixth book <u>On the Trinity</u>,[2] thus saying: « We say that the Trinity is God alone, although He is always with the spirits and the holy souls, but we say "*alone*" [solum], because no other than the Holy Trinity is God. For God is not those (spirits and souls) with that (Trinity) », and/or some other (things), but the Trinity itself only [tantum], not they and/or others, is God.

« Nevertheless », as (St.) Augustine[3] says, « even if the aforesaid were said of the Father alone, yet the Son and/or the Holy Spirit would not be excluded, because *those Three are One*; just as in the Apocalypse there is read of the Son, that *He has a written name, which no one knows, but He Himself*. For not from this [inde] is the

inde separatur Pater, et Spiritus sanctus, quia inseparabiles sunt ». Aliquando etiam nominantur Pater et Filius, et tacetur Spiritus sanctus; sicut Veritas ad Patrem loquens ait:[4] *Ut cognoscant te et quem misisti Iesum Christum esse unum verum Deum*. « Cur ergo, inquit Augustinus,[5] tacuit de Spiritu santo? Quia consequens est, ut ubicumque nominatur unus, sicut Pater et Filius, tanta pace uni adhaerens intelligatur etiam ipsa Pax, quamvis non commemoretur ». Uno ergo istorum nominato, etiam reliqui intelliguntur; quod in pluribus Scripturae locis occurit.

Father and/or the Holy Spirit separated. And when there is said: *No one knows the Father but the Son*; not from this is the Father, and the Holy Spirit, separated, because They are inseparable ». Sometimes also the Father and the Son are named, and the nothing is said of [tacetur] the Holy Spirit; just as the Truth speaking to the Father says:[4] *That they may cognize Thee and Him whom Thou has sent, Jesus Christ, to be the one, True God*. « Why, therefore », says (St.) Augustine,[5] « did he keep silent [tacuit] concerning the Holy Spirit? Because the consequent is, that wheresoever One is named, such as the Father and the Son, there is understood (to be) adhering to Him with such a great peace Peace Himself, although He is not commemorated ». Therefore, with One of Them named, the Rest are also understood; which occurs in very many passages [locis] of Scripture.

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sequen- / -tibus locis excerpsit Augustini doctrinam, quod semper tota Trinitas intelligitur in citatis locis sacrae Scripturae. Verba Augustini haec sunt: Ac per hoc quod ait Apostolus (I. Tim. 6, 15.): *Beatus et solus potens*, non cogor de Patre tantummodo accipere, sed de Deo, quod est ipsa Trinitas. Cap. 13. n. 2: *Soli sapienti Deo* (Rom. 16, 27.): Deus itaque, quod est ipsa Trinitas propterea *solus* sapiens recte dicitur, quia solus secundum substantiam suam sapiens est. Cap. 9. n. 1: *Invisibili soli Deo* (I. Tim. 1, 17.): Si dixisset *soli Patri*, difficilius fortasse quaestio solveretur; qui vero dixit *soli Deo*, non est utique contra nos; et Unigentus quippe in Dei forma et Spiritus sanctus in sua natura est invisibilis. Unus enim et solus Deus a nobis ipsa Trinitas predicatur. Cap. 12. n. 2: *Beatus et solus potens, Rex regum* etc. (I. Tim. 6, 16.): Nihil hic video dictum, quod non conveniat Trinitati. — Etiam alibi eadem docet Augustinus, cfr. libr. I. de Trinitate c. 6. n. 10. et 11, ex quo Magister mutuavit ultima verba.

[1] Cap. 13. n. 1. Ulitmis verbis codd. B C D haec adiiciunt: Non ergo Pater solus, nec solus Filius, nec solus Spiritus sanctus Deus est, sed ipsa Trinitas unus Deus solus est.

[2] Cap. 7. n. 9. — Vat. et ed. 4 ante *dicens* omittunt *ita*.

[3] Libr. II. contra Maximinum c. 13. n. 1; sed Magister nonnulla omisit vel addidit. Tres in hoc textu occurrentes loci sacrae Scripturae sunt: I. Ioan. 5, 7; Apocal. 19, 12; et Matth. 11, 27, ubi Vulgata: Et nemo novit Filius nisi Pater; neque Patrem quis novit nisi Filius. S. Bonav. (hic dub. 3.), uti testantur codd., in Magistro legit: Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater.

[4] Ioan. 17, 3.

[5] Libr. VI. de Trinitate c. 9. n. 10. Etiam propositio praecedens secundum sensum inde excerpta est. — In fine sola Vat. addit: *ut ibidem amplificat*

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passages, excerpted the doctrine (St.) Augustine, that one is always to understand the whole Trinity in the cited passages of Sacred Scripture. The words of (St.) Augustine are these: And through this, which the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:15) says: *The blessed and only Powerful One*, I am not driven to accept it in the manner only of the Father, but of the God, which is the Trinity Itself. Chapter 13, n. 2: *To the only wise God* (Rom. 16:27): And so the God, which is the Trinity Itself, is on this account said (to be) the *only* wise One, because He alone according to His own Substance is wise. Chapter 9, n. 1: *To the invisible, the only God* (1 Tim. 1:17): If he had said *to the only Father*, perhaps the question would be solved with more difficulty [difficilius]; however, he who said *to the only God*, is certainly not against us; and indeed the Only-Begotten in the Form of God and the Holy Spirit in His own Nature is invisible. For the one and only God is predicated by us (to be) the Trinity Itself. Chapter 12, n. 2: *the blessed and only powerful One, the King of kings* etc. (1 Tim. 6:16) [Trans. note: In the Douay-Rheims Challoner edition of the Vulgate, this is found in v. 15, not v. 16]: I see nothing here said, that does not befit the Trinity. — (St.) Augustine also teaches elsewhere the same (doctrine), cf. On the Trinity, Bk. I, ch. 6, nn. 10 and 11, from which Master (Peter) changed his last words.

[1] Chapter 13, n. 1. To the final words, codices B C and D add these: Therefore not the Father alone, nor the Son alone, nor the Holy Spirit alone is God, but the Trinity Itself is the one, sole God.

[2] Chapter 7, n. 9. — The Vatican edition and edition 4 before *saying* [dicens] omit *thus* [ita]. [Trans. note: The argument in the Latin text here gives the impression that in classical times it was generally assumed that, as all those who were in Heaven were

Augustinus.

divine, God was not only not alone, but also not solely God; however, whether this is the import of St. Augustine's argument, but be ascertained on the basis of the context of his cited work.]

[3] Against Maximinus, Bk. II, ch. 13, n. 1; but Master (Peter) has omitted and/or added not a few (words). The three passages of Sacred Scripture occurring in this text are 1 Jn. 5:7; Apoc. 19:12; and Mt. 11:27, where the Vulgate reads: And no one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son. St. Bonaventure (here in dubium 3), reads in Master Peter, what is found in the codices: No one knows the Son except the Father [Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater].

[4] Jn. 17:3.

[5] On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 9, n. 10. The preceding proposition has also been excerpted from this, according to its sense. — At the end the Vatican edition alone adds: *as Augustine explains the same* [ut ibidem amplificat Augustinus].

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.

Qualiter dictiones exclusivae accipiantur in divinis.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 378-381.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI

In what way exclusive sayings are accepted among the divine.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 378-381.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Hic oritur quaestio ex praedictis trahens originem.

Here arises the question, drawing its origin etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra probavit Magister aequalitatem personarum; hic, quia in probatione dubias quasdam[1] dixerat rationes propter dictiones exclusivas, movet illas dubitationes et solivt. Et habet haec pars tres partes secundum tria dubia, quae proponit.

Primo enim quaerit de hac locutione:[2] tantus est solus Pater, quantus Pater et Filius, et hoc primo capitulo.

Secundo proponit hanc sive quaerit de hac: solus Pater est Deus, et hoc facit secundo capitulo, ibi: *Post haec quaeritur, utrum, sicut dicitur solus Pater* etc.

Tertio quaerit de hac : Trinitas est solus Deus ; et hoc facit tertio capitulo, ibi : *Sed iterum quaeritur, quomodo ipsam Trinitatem*. Et in qualibet istarum partium primo movet dubitationem, secundo solvit.[3]

[1] Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *quasdam*.
[2] Vat. cum cod. cc *ratione*, sed minus bene et contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1. Mox in Vat. deest *et hoc primo capitulo*, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1. Similis omissio recurrit paulo infra, scil. *secundo capitulo* et *tertio capitulo*.
[3] Vat. et cod. cc, refragantibus tamen aliis mss. et ed. 1, *movetur dubitatio, secundo solvitur*.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) proved the equality of the Persons; here, because in the proof he has said (that) certain[1] reasons (were) doubtful on account of (their) exclusive sayings, he moves those doubts and solves (them). And this part has three parts according to the three doubts, which he proposes.

For *first* he asks of this expression [locutione]:[2] "as much as is the Father alone, so much the Father and the Son", and this in the first chapter (of his Distinction).

Second he proposes this (doubt) or asks of it: "the Father alone is God", and this he does in the second chapter, there (where he says): *After this, there is asked, whether, just as there is said: 'the Father alone* etc..

Third he asks of this: "the Trinity is the only God"; and this he does in the third chapter, there (where he says): *But again there is asked, in what manner do we say that the Trinity itself*. And in any of those parts of his, he first moves the doubt, second he solves it.[3]

[1] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied *certain* [quasdam].
[2] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, but less well and contrary to all the other codices and edition 1, reads *reasons* [ratione]. Next in the Vatican edition there is lacking *and this in the first chapter (of his Distinction)* [et hoc primo capitulo], which however is extant in the manuscripts and edition 1. A similar omission recurs a little below this, namely, *in the second chapter* [secundo capitulo] and *in the third chapter* [tertio capitulo].
[3] The Vatican edition and codex cc, yet breaking with the other manuscripts and edition 1, read *the doubt is moved, second it is solved* [movetur dubitation, secundo solvitur].

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TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam huius partis est hic quaestio de dictionibus exclusivis. Et circa hoc principaltier quaeruntur[1] duo.

Primo, quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva in divinis vere addatur termino substantiali.

Secundo, utrum vere addatur termino

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of this part here there is this question concerning exclusive sayings [dictiones]. And about this there are asked[1] principally two (things):

First there is asked, whether among the divine an exclusive saying is truly added to a substantial term.

Second, whether it is truly added to a

relativo.

Et quantum ad primum quaeruntur duo:

Primo:[2] utrum dictio exclusiva vere addatur termino substantiali a parte *subiecti*.

Secundo, si vere addatur[3] a parte *praedicati*.

relative term.

And as much as regards the first, two (things) are asked:

First:[2] whether an exclusive saying is truly added to a substantial term on the part of a *subject*.

Second, if it is truly added[3] on the part of a *predicate*.

ARTICULUS I.

De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino substantiali.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum vere dicatur: solus Deus est Pater.

ARTICLE I

On exclusive sayings added to a substantial term.

QUESTION 1

Whether there is said in a true manner: "God alone is the Father".

Quod autem vere[4] addatur huic termino *Deus* a parte *subiecti*, ostenditur hoc modo: Deus habet aliquid proprium; sed proprium est quod inest soli:[5] ergo etc. Et quia constat, quod exclusio vere additur termino substantiali respectu praedicati *essentialis*, unde bene dicitur: solus Deus creat; quaeritur, utrum vere addatur ei respectu praedicati *proprii* sive[6] termini *relativi*, utrum scilicet vere dicatur: *solus Deus est Pater*. Et quod sic, videtur:

That it[4] **is,** moreover, truly added to this term "*God*" on the part of a *subject*, is shown in this manner: God has something proper; but (something) "proper" is what is in (something) alone:[5] ergo etc.. And because it is established, that an exclusion is truly added to a substantial term in respect to an *essential* predicate, whence there is rightly said: "God alone creates" [solus Deus creat]; there is asked, whether it is truly added to it in respect to a *proper* predicate or[6] a *relative* term, whether, that is, there is truly said: "God alone is the Father" [solus Deus est Pater]. And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Per suam expositionem, quae est: *solus Deus est Pater*, id est non alius quam Deus est Pater:[7] ergo solus Deus est Pater. Et quod sit ista eius expositio, hoc habetur et a communi usu et a Philosopho,[8] qui dicit, quod « *solus* idem est quod *non cum alio* ».

1. Through its exposition, which is: "*God alone is the Father*", that is 'not other than God is the Father':[7] therefore 'God alone is the Father'. And that this is its exposition, this is had both from common usage and from the Philosopher,[8] who says, that « "*alone*" is that which is *not with another* ».

2. Item, hoc[9] videtur a convertibili, quoniam istae duae convertuntur: nihil praeter Petrum currit, ergo solus Petrus currit: ergo et istae duae: nihil praeter Deum est Pater, et: solus Deus est Pater. Sed prima est vera, quia haec est falsa: nihil est Pater, et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo:[10] ergo etc.

2. Likewise, this[9] seems from the convertible, since those two are converted: "nothing besides Peter runs", therefore "Peter alone runs": therefore also those two: "nothing besides God is the Father", and: "God alone is the Father". But the first is true, because this is false: "nothing is the Father", and (this false proposition) has no instance except in God:[10] ergo etc..

3. Item, a quocumque removetur quod est in *plus*, removetur quod est in *minus*;[11] sed *esse Deum* est in plus quam *esse Patrem*; ergo a quocumque removetur Deus, et Pater. Sed quaecumque sic se habent, quod a quocumque removetur unum, et

3. Likewise, from whatsoever there is removed what is in *more*, there is removed what is in *less*;[11] but "*to be God*" [esse Deum] is in More than "*to be the Father*"; therefore from whomsoever there is removed "God", (there is) also (removed)

alterum, unum praecise praedicatur de altero, nec habet instantiam: ergo Pater praecise praedicatur de Deo; sed si praecise, ergo cum exclusione: ergo etc.

"the Father". But whatsoever thus hold themselves in this manner, from whichsoever there is removed one, also the other, one is precisely predicted of the other, nor does it have an instance: therefore the Father is precisely predicated of God; but if precisely, therefore with exclusion: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Terminus accidentalis implicat rem suam circa suum subiectum — ut patet, cum dicitur: homo albus currit, circa hunc terminum *homo* implicatur albedo — ergo similiter cum dicitur: solus Deus est Pater, circa *Deum* implicatur *solitudo*. Sed Hilarius[12] dicit, quod « Deus non est solitarius confitendus »: ergo etc. Et ratio ista concludit, quod non possit vere addi nec cum praedicato *proprio* nec *communi*.

On the contrary: 1. An accidental term implicates its own matter [rem] about its own subject — as is clear, when there is said: "a white man runs", about this term "*man*" there is implicated whiteness — therefore similarly with there is said: "God alone is the Father", about "*God*" there is implicated *solitude*. But (St.) Hilary[12] says, that « God is not to be confessed (to be) solitary »: ergo etc.. And that reckoning of his concludes, that it cannot be truly added, neither with a *proper* nor a *common* predicate.

2. Item, ostenditur, quod non possit vere addi respectu praedicati *communis*, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus creat. Hoc enim nomen *Deus* de se habet suppositionem quasi indefinitam respectu pesonarum,[13] ergo reddit locutionem veram pro aliquo: sed pro quolibet est falsa — haec enim est falsa: solus . . .

2. Likewise, it is shown, that (an exclusive term) cannot be truly added in respect to a *common* predicate, as when there is said: "God alone creates". For this name "*God"* of itself has a quasi indefinite supposition in respect to the Persons,[13] therefore it renders the saying true for Any: but for Any it is false — for this is false: "the Father / alone creates" . . .

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[1] Vat. cum paucis tantum codd. *quaerenda sunt*.
[2] Multi codd. cum ed. 1 *Primum est*.
[3] Cod. I adiungit *huic termino*.
[4] Supple: dictio exclusiva *solus*; Vat. omittit particulam *autem* et addit *ly solus*, sed praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1.
[5] Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.
[6] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *sive* pro *sicut*.
[7] Plures codd. ut A C F O R U ee omittunt in hac propositione verba *id est*, loco quorum codd. S Y post *non* ponunt *enim*. Cod. W omittit in principio propositionis particulam *solus*, et loco *id est* habet *et*, lectio non spernenda, quam cod. T a posteriore manu correctus cum lectione aliorum mss. ita coniungit: *solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater*. Vide infra resp. ad 3. obiect., ubi expositio eadem datur.
[8] Libr. II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo supra ex multis codd. ut A G H I K R X Y aa ee ff et ed. 1 post *habetur* adiecimus *et*.
[9] In codd. V X additur *idem*, et mox in codd. S Y pro *a* ponitur *ex*.
[10] Aristot., II. Prior. c. 26.(c. 28.) ait: Instantia autem est propositio propositioni contraria. — Sensus igitur verborum *et non habet instantiam nisi in Deo* est: propositio huic falsae propositioni: *nihil est*

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[1] The Vatican edition, together with only a few codices, reads *are to be asked* [quaerenda sunt].
[2] Many codices, together with edition 1, read *The first is* [Primum est].
[3] Codex I adds *to this term* [huic termino].
[4] Supply: the exclusive saying "*alone*"; the Vatican edition omits the particle *moreover* [autem] and adds *the word* "*alone*" [ly solus], but contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1.
[5] Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. "On the Proper".
[6] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *or* [sive] for *just as* [sicut].
[7] Very many codices, such as A C G O R U and ee, omit in this proposition the words *that is* [id est], in place of which codices S and Y put *for* [enim]. Codex W omits at the beginning of the proposition the particle *alone* [solus], and in place of *that is* [id est] has *and* [et], a reading not to be spurned, which codex T, corrected by a later hand, conjoins with the reading of the other manuscripts thus: *God alone is the Father, that is, God is the Father and no other than God is the Father* [solus Deus est Pater, id est, Deus est Pater et non alius quam Deus est Pater]. See below the respose to the 3rd. objection, where the same exposition is given.
[8] The Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. II, ch. 3 (c. 22). — A little above, from many codices, such as A G H I

Pater, contraria et vera est: *nonnisi seu solus Deus est Pater*; quod sic patet, si haec: *nihil est Pater* est falsa, ergo haec erit vera: *aliquid est Pater*; ergo vel creatura vel Deus; non creatura seu nihil extra Deum, ut constat; ergo solus Deus. — Paulo ante Vat. praeter fidem multorum mss. ut A F G H S T X Y etc. et ed. 1 *ergo solus Deus Pater* loco *et: solus Deus est Pater*.

[11] Cfr. supra d. 19. p. I. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opp. — In hac propositione auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus post *removetur* in Vat. additum *hoc*.

[12] Libr. IV. de Trin. n. 18: Nobis quoque nec solitarius tantum nec diversus est confitendus.

[13] Cfr. supra d. 4. q. 4. — Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1, *solum uni* pro *uni soli*.

K R X Y aa ee and ff, and edition 1, we have inserted *both* [et] after *is has* [habetur].

[9] In codices V and X there is added *same* [idem], and next in codices S and Y there is put *from* [ex] for *from* [a].

[10] Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 26 (ch. 28) says: Moreover, an "instance" is a proposition contrary to the proposition. — Therefore the sense of the words *and it does not have an instance, except in God* is: the true and contrary proposition to this one: *nothing is the Father* [nihil est Pater] is: *none but (God) or God alone is the Father* [nonnisi seu solus Deus est Pater], which is thus clear, if this: *nothing is the Father* is false, therefoer this will also be true: *something is the Father*; therefore either a creature or God; not a creature or nothing outside of God, as is established; therefore God alone. — A little before this the Vatican edition, not trusting in many manuscripts, such as A F G H S T X Y etc., and edition 1, has *therefore God alone (is) the Father* [ergo solus Deus Pater] in place of *and: God alone is the Father* [et: solus Deus est Pater]. [Trans. note: an *instance* here is used in the sense of a *contrary example or evidence*.]

[11] Cf. above d. 19, p. I, q. 4, first opposing argument. — In this proposition, on the authority of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged the *this* [hoc] after *there is removed* [removetur], which is added in the Vatican edition.

[12] On the Trinity, Bk. IV, n. 18: By us, too, neither is He to be confessed as only "solitary" nor "diverse".

[13] Cf. above d. 4, q. 4. — A little below (on the next page) this the Vatican edition together with codex cc, but contrary to all the other codices and edition 1, has *only to One* [solum uni] for *to One alone* [uni soli].

Pater creat — ergo cum omne praedicatum essentiale conveniat tribus, et non uni soli, nullo modo potest addi dictio exclusiva respectu talis praedicati subiecto communi.

"the Father / alone creates" — therefore since every essential predicate convenes with the Three, and not to One alone, in no manner can an exclusive saying be added to a subject in respect to such a common predicate.

3. Item, quod non respectu *proprii*, videtur, quia si haec est vera: solus Deus est Pater: ergo a simplici conversa et haec: solus Pater est Deus; sed ista est falsa: ergo etc. *Si dicas*, quod non convertitur similiciter; *contra*: habet intellectum universalis negativae et particularis affirmativae, et utraque convertitur simpliciter: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it seems that (it can) not (be truly added) in respect to *a proper* (predicate), because if this is true: "God alone is the Father": therefore by a simple converse this also: "the Father alone is God"; but that is false: ergo etc.. *If you say*, that it is not converted simply; *on the contrary*: it has an understanding of a universal negative and a particular affirmative (proposition), and each is converted simply: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Terminus solus in divinis non dicitur categorematice, ut idem sensus sit ac

CONCLUSION

The term " alone" is not said among the divine categorically, so that its sense be

solitarius; bene vero dicitur syncategorematice respectu praedicati tum substantialis, tum personalis.

"the same" or "solitary"; but it is said rightly, co-categorically in respect to both a substantial as well as a personal predicate.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod haec dictio *solus* potest esse *categorema*, vel *syncategorema*.[1] Secundum quod est *categorema*, sic est nomen adiectivum, absolute ponens rem suam circa suum substantivum, et res sua est *solitudo*. Unde tantum valet sic[2] *solus* quantum *solitarius*. Et quia solitudo nullo modo recipitur in divinis quantum ad substantiam, quia est in multis personis, hoc nomen *solus* non recipitur in divinis cum terminis[3] substantialibus, sicut ostendit prima ratio.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that this saying "*alone*" [solus] can be a *category* [categorema] and/or a *co-category* [syncategorema].[1] According to which it is a *category*, thus it is an adjectival name [nomen adiectuvum], absolutely positing its own matter [rem] about its own substantive, and its own matter is "*solitude*" Whence in this manner,[2] "*alone*" is worth as much as "*solitary*" [solitarius]. And because solitude is in no manner received among the divine as much as regards the Substance, because It is in many Persons, this name "*alone*" is not received among the divine with substantial terms,[3] as the first reason shows.

Si autem accipiatur[4] in quantum est *syncategorema*, sic privat associationem et importat aliquam negationem. Et sic, cum aliquod praedicatum et substantiale et personale praecise dicatur[5] de nomine substantiali, sic vere dicitur in divinis et respectu praedicati *substantialis*, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus creat, et respectu[6] *personalis*, ut cum dicitur: solus Deus est Pater.

However, if it is accepted[4] inasmuch as it is a *co-category*, it thus deprives association and conveys some negation. And in this manner, since some predicate, both substantial and personal, is said[5] precisely of the substantial noun, it is in this manner truly said among the divine and in respect to a *substantial* predicate, as when there is said: "God alone creates", and in respect to a *personal* (predicate),[6] as when there is said: "God alone is the Father".

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de albo, quod ponit rem suam circa substantivum; dicendum, quod non est simile, secundum quod hoc nomen *solus* tenetur syncategorematice, quia *albus* est dispositio subiecti absoluta, unde absolute ponit rem suam circa terminum, sed *solus* ratione negationis non absolute; et ideo non ponit solitudinem, sed praecisionem.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected concerning "white", that it posits its own matter about the substantive; it must be said, that it is not similar, according to which this name "*alone*" is held co-categorically, because "*white*" is an absolute disposition of a subject, whence it posits absolutely its own matter about the term, but "*alone*" by reason of its negation does not absolutely; and for that reason it does not posit solitude, but a precision.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod terminus substantialis debet *reddere locutionem veram*[7] pro aliqua persona; dicendum, quod terminus, cui additur exclusio, respectum habet ad *preadicatum*, et respectum habet ad *exclusionem*; et licet respectu praedicati possit habere suppositionem *personalem*, ut cum dicitur: solus homo currit; tamen regula est apud sophistas,[8] quod per comparationem ad dictionem exclusivam talis terminus habet suppositionem *simplicem*, unde nullo modo

2. To that which is objected second, that a substantial term ought to *render the expression true*[7] for any Person; it must be said, that a term, to which there is added an exclusion, has a looking-back to the *predicate*, and has a looking-back to the *exclusion*; and though in respect to the predicate it can have a *personal* supposition, as when there is said: "the man alone runs"; yet the rule among the Sophists[8] is, that through a comparison to the exclusive saying such a term has a

licet descendere. Et hoc est quod dicitur in libro de Regulis fidei,[9] quod dictio exclusiva facit exclusionem quantum ad *genus rei*, non quantum ad *rem generis*, quia ratione formae communis, quae est *genus rei*, non ratione suppositi, quod est *res generis*.

simple supposition, whence in no manner is it allowed to descend (to a supposit). And this is what is said in the book On the Rules of the Faith,[9] that an exclusive saying causes exclusion as much as regards the *genus of the thing* [genus rei], not as much as regards *matter of the genus* [rem generis], because by reason of the common form, which is the *genus of the thing*, not by reason of the supposit, which is the *matter of the genus*.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod conversa est falsa; dicendum, quod illa non est sua conversa; quia ista: solus Deus est Pater, habet intellectum affirmativae, scilicet Deus est Pater, et haec convertitur simpliciter; et habet rationem[10] negativae huius: nullus alius a Deo est Pater, et haec similiter convertitur simpliciter; sed haec non est sua conversa: nullus alius a Patre est Deus, sed haec: nihil quod est Pater, est aliud a Deo. Idem enim quod subiiciebatur in prima, debet praedicari in secunda; et sic patet illud.

3. To that which is objected last, that the converse is false; it must be said, that that is not its converse; because this: "God alone is the Father", has the understanding of an affirmative (proposition), namely "God is the Father", and this is converted simply; and (the original proposition) has the reckoning[10] of this negative (proposition): "none other than God is the Father", and this similarly is converted simply; but this is not its converse: "none other than the Father is God", but (rather) this (is): "nothing which is the Father, is other than God". For the same which was subjected in the first (part), ought to be predicated in the second; and in this manner that (objection) is clear.

SCHOLION.

I. Quaestiones huius distinctionis satis sunt intricatae, sed a theologis illius aetatis post Magistrum Sententiarum in scholis communiter cum magna substilitate dialectica tractabantur. Serviunt ad maiorem verborum proprietatem quoad adordandum Trinitatis myusterium observandum. Supponit Seraphicus in hac et seqq. qq. plura, quae in antiqua logica de dictionibus exclu- / sivis, . . .

SCHOLIUM

I. The questions of this distinction are sufficiently intricate, but were treated, by the theologians of that age after the Master of the Sentences, in the schools commonly with great dialectical subtlety. These serve to observe the greater propriety of words in regard to adoring the mystery of the Trinity. The Seraphic (Doctor) supposes in this and the following questions, very many things, which in the ancient logic concerning exclusive sayings, . . .

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[1] Plures codd. ut B D Q S cum ed. 1 hic et in sequentibus *categorematica vel syncategorematica*, prout scil. *solus* se ipso sine additione alterius termini vel tantum iunctus alteri aliquid determinate significat. Paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *absolutum* pro *absolute*.

[2] Vat. cum cod. cc perperam *hic*. Mox post primum *quantum* in cod. I repetitur *valet*.

[3] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *cum terminis*, quae verba minus bene absunt a Vat. et cod. cc. Paulo ante cod. bb post *quia est* repetit *substantia*, et cod. Y post *personis* addit *ideo*.

[4] Cod. X *accipitur*.

[5] Cod. T *praedicatur*.

[6] In cod. V repetitur *praedicati*. Mox post *Pater* cod.

[1] Very many codices, such as B D Q S, together with edition 1, here and in the following sentences read *categorical and/or co-categorical* [caegorematica vel syncategorematica], insofar as, that is, "*alone*" [solus] signifies, by itself without the addition of the other term and/or only joined to the other, something in a determinate manner. A little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, has *as an absolute* [absolutum] for *absolutely* [absolute].

[2] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, faultily reads *here* [hic] for *in this manner* [sic]. Next at the end of this same sentence codex I repeats *is worth* [valet].

[3] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1,

X adiungit: *id est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater*.
[7] De hac locutione vide supra d. 4. q. 1. in Scholio, ubi et plura invenis de suppositione *personali* et *siimplici* ac de *descensu*, de quibus paulo infra loquitur S. Doctor.
[8] Intellige in sensu bono, scil. homines, qui eruditi et doctores sunt in logica; in eodem sensu occurit apud S. Thomam, S. p. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3. — Regula, quam adducit S. Doctor, invenitur in Summula Petri Hispani, Tract. de Suppositionibus, in subdivisione suppositionis simplicis, ubi hoc adducit exemplum: « Omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale; ibi iste terminus *hominem* simplicem habet suppositionem, quia non licet fieri descensum sub ipso; unde non sequitur: omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale, ergo omne animal praeter hunc hominem est irrationale » etc. — Paulo infra ed. 1 *confusam immobilem* pro *simplicem*; vide Petrum Hispanum loco cit., et nota *suppositionem confusam immobile* dici etiam *confusam tantum*, cui opponitur *confusa mobilis seu distributiva*.
[9] Alanus ab Insulis, in libro: Theologicae regulae, reg. 29.
[10] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *habet etiam intellectum* pro *et habet rationem*.

we have supplied *with* and *terms* [cum terminis], which words are absent, less well, from the Vatican edition and codex cc. A little before this codex bb at *because It is* [quia est] reads *the Substance* [substantia] for *It*, and codex Y after *Persons* [personis] adds *for that reason* [ideo].
[4] Codex X has the indicative *is accepted* [accipitur] for the subjunctive.
[5] Codex T has *is predicated* [praedicatur].
[6] In codex V there is repeated *predicate* [predicati]. Next at the end of the response, there is added by codex X *that is, He, who is the only God, is the Father* [id est ille qui est solus Deus est Pater].
[7] On this saying see above d. 4, q. 1 in the Scholium, where you will also find more on *personal* and *simple* supposition and on the *(logical) descent*, of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks a little below this.
[8] Understand in the non-pejorative sense, that is, those men, who were learned in and doctors of logic; it occurs in the same sense in St. Thomas, Summa, p. I, q. 31, a. 3, in reply to n. 3. — The rule, which the Seraphic Doctor adduces, is found in the Summula of Peter of Spain, in the “Tract on Suppositions”, in the subdivision on simple supposition, where he adduces this example: « “Every animal besides man is irrational”; there that term “*man*” has a simple supposition, because it is not licit that a (logical) descent be made under it; whence it does not follow: ‘every animal besides man is irrational, therefore every animal besides this man is irrational » etc.. — A little below this edition 1 reads *a confused, immobile* [confusam immobilem] for *simple* [simplicem]; se Peter of Spain loc. cit., and not that *a confused, immobile supposition* is also said to be *a (supposition) only confused* [confusam tantum], to which is opposed the *confused mobile or distributive (supposition)* [confuse mobilis su distributiva].
[9] Alan of Lille, in his book, Theological Rules, rule 29.
[10] The Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *(the original proposition) also has the understanding* [habet etiam intellectum] for *and (the original proposition) has the reckoning* [*et habet rationem*].

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exclu- / -sivis, de eorum speciebus et de quinque regulis in expositione earum observandis magis subtiliter quam utiliter tradebantur. Sufficiat notare haec pauca.

1. *Dictio exclusiva* est illa, in qua vel *subiectum* vel *praedicatum* afficitur particulis exclusivis, ut *tantum*, *solum*, *dumtaxat* etc. Si signum exclusivam afficit *subiectum*, tunc propositio significat, praedicatum convenrire tantum illi subiecto, non autem aliis subiectis v. g. tantum homo est risibilis. Si vero particula exclusiva afficit *praedicatum*, tunc significat, illud

concerning their species and concerning the five rules to be observed in their exposition, used to be handed down with greater subtlety than utility. Let it suffice to note these few.

1. *An exclusive saying* is that, in which either the *subject* and/or the *predicate* is affixed with exclusive particles, such as *only* [tantum], *alone* [solum], *no more than / no less than* [dumtaxat] etc.. If the exclusive sign affixes the *subject*, then the proposition signifies, that the predicate convenes only with that subject, but not with other subjects, v. g. “only man is risible”.

tantummodo praedicatum, ceteris exclusis, huic subiecto convenire v. g. superbus non amat nisi se ipsum.

However, if the exclusive particle affixes the *predicate*, then (the proposition) signifies, that only that predicate, having excluded all others, convenes with this subject, v. g. “a proud man loves no one but himself”.

2. Omnis propositio exclusiva affirmativa exponitur per duas propositiones, quarum una affirmat praedicatum de subiecto, altera vero excludit vel omne aliud suppositum a consortio praedicati, vel aliud praedicatum a subiecto. Ita propositio: solus Deus est Pater, sic exponitur: Deus est Pater, et nihil, quod non est Deus, est Pater. Cfr. hic solut. ad. 3.

2. Every exclusive, affirmative proposition is expounded through two propositions, one of which affirms the predicate of the subject, but the other excludes either every other supposit from a share in the predicate, and/or (excludes) another predicate from the subject. Thus the proposition: “God alone is the Father”, is thus expounded: ‘God is the Father, and nothing, which is not God, is the Father’. Cf. here the solution to n. 3.

3. Circa alios terminos exclusivos, ut *tantum*, *dumtaxat*, non est difficultas, quia non habent alium sensum nisi exclusivum. Terminus vero *solus* habet sensum aequivocum. Potest enim intelligi vel categorematice i. e. ut per se significat aliquid, et tunc *solus* idem est ac *solitarius*; vel syncategorematice, quando ut adiectivum adiunctum est alicui substantivo. In primo sensu non facit propositionem exclusivam nec ullo modo admittitur in divinis. In secundo sensu facit propositionem exclusivam et addi potest termino esentiali (ut Deus), qui ponitur ut subiectum respectu praedicati sive essentialis sive personalis, quod soli Deo competit.

3. About the other exclusive terms, such as *only* [tantum] and *at no more than / no less than* [dumtaxat], there is no difficulty, because they do not have no other sense, but the exclusive. However the term “*alone*” [solus] has an equivocal sense. For it can be understood either *categorically* [categorematice], i. e. as signifying through itself something, and then “*alone*” is the same as “*solitary*”; and/or co-categorically [syncategorematice], when as an adjective it has been adjoined to some substantive. In the first sense it does not make the proposition exclusive nor is it in any manner admitted among the divine. In the second sense it makes the proposition exclusive and it can be added to an essential term (such as “God”), which it posits as a subject in respect to either an essential or personal predicate, which befits God alone.

4. *Conversio* propositionis est inversio extremorum propositionis, ita ut, retenta ipsius propositionis veritate, ex praedicato fiat subiectum et ex subiecto praedicatum. Huius conversionis triplex distinguitur species, scil. *simplex*, *per accidens* et *per contrapositionem*. Variae in logica dantur regulae, ut rite fiat haec conversio.

4. The *conversion* of a proposition is the inversion of the extremes of the proposition, such that, with the truth of the proposition itself retained, from the predicate there is made a subject and from the subject a predicate. Of this conversion there is distinguished a threefold species, namely, *simple*, *per accidens*, and *through contraposition*. Various rules are given in logic, to make this conversion in the proper manner.

II. Ad explicandam solut. ad 2. servire possunt verba S. Thomas (S. I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 3.): « Ut sophistae dicunt, dictio exclusiva immobilitat terminum, cui adiungitur, ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus pro aliquo suppositorum. Non enim sequitur: solus homo est animal

II. To explain the solution to n. 2, the words of St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 31, a. 3, in reply to n. 3) can serve: « As the Sophists say: an exclusive saying immobilizes the term, to which it is adjoined, so that there cannot come to be under it a descent on behalf of any of the supposits. For it does

rationale, mortale, ergo solus Socrates ». — In eadem solutione remanet difficultas, quam movet Brulifer hic, quod in una eademque propositione idem terminus iuxta duplicem respectum, scil. ad exclusionem et ad praedicatum, non possit habere suppositionem *simplicem* (seu excludentem descensum ad supposita) et suppositionem *personalem*. Ad hoc dicendum est, quod propositio exclusiva virtualiter continet duas propositiones, ut supra dictum est, et quod S. Bonaventura non dicit, ipsam actu habere suppositionem simplicem et personalem, nempe ratione materiae. Quoad terminos *suppositionem simplicem* et *personalem* cfr. d. 4. q. 1. Scholon.

III. In conclusione omnes conveniunt. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. n. 3. a. 2. in fine. — Scot., de hac et tribus seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; de hac et seqq. aa. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 40. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. collater. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seqq. S. a. 75. q. 5. per totam. — Durand., de hac et tribus seqq. hic a. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et tribus seqq. hic q. unic. — Biel, de hac et tribus seqq. aa. hic q. unic.

not follow: 'man alone is a rational, mortal, animal', therefore '(man) alone (is) Socrates' ». — In the same solution there remains the difficulty, which Brülifer moves here, that in the one and same proposition the same term according to a twofold respect, that is, to the exclusion and to the predicate, cannot have a *simple* supposition (or an excluding descent to the supposits) and a *personal* supposition. To this it must be said, that an exclusive proposition virtually contains two propositions, as has been said above, and which St. Bonaventure does not say, the same (proposition) actually [actu] has a simple and a personal supposition, namely by reason of the matter. In regard to the terms "*simple*" and "*personal*" supposition, cf. d. 4, q. 1, in the Scholium.

III. In the conclusion all agree. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 66, n. 3, a. 2, and the end. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following 3 questions, here in each version, in q. sole. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2; Summa., I, q. 31, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3; on this and the following articles, Summa., p. I, tr. 9, q. 40, m. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole. aa. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 4. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 3, collateral 1. — Henry of Ghent., on this and the following questions, Summa., a. 75, q. 5. throughout. — Durandus, on this and the following 3 questions, here in aa. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following 3 questions, here in q. sole. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following 3 articles, here in q. sole.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 381-383.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum dictio exclusiva vere addi possit termino substantiali a parte praedicati.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum dictio exclusiva vere possit addi termino substantiali a parte praedicati. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus sexto de Trinitate:[1] « Patrem dicimus esse Deum, sed non esse solum Deum, esse autem solum Deum dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ». *Si tu dicas*, quod ly *solum* intelligitur ex parte subiecti; obiicitur expressius per hoc quod dicit Augustinus contra Maximinum:[2] « Ipsa Trinitas est unus solus verus Deus »; constat quod in hac *solus Deus* non potest esse dispositio ex parte subiecti, quia sic esset sermo incongruus: ergo etc.

2. Item, hoc ipsum[3] videtur per *expositionem*: Trinitas est Deus et non aliud quam Deus, ergo Trinitas est solus Deus; praemissae sunt verae: ergo et conclusio.

3. Item, ratione videtur per *simile*: quando praedicatum non inest alii quam subiecto,

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI

ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 381-383.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUESTION 2

Whether an exclusive saying can be truly added to a substantial term on the part of the predicate.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether an exclusive saying can truly be added to a substantial term on the part of a predicate. And that (it is so), is shown in this manner:

1. (St.) Augustine (says) in the sixth (book) On the Trinity:[1] « We say that the Father is God, but not that He is the only God [solum Deum], however we do say that the only God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit ». *If you say*, that the word "*solum*" [ly solum] is understood (above) on the part of the subject (i.e. as 'He is not alone God'); it is expressly objected through this which (St.) Augustine says Against Maximinus:[2] « The Trinity Itself is the one, only, True God [unus solus verum Deus] »; it is established that in this "*only* . . . *God*" cannot be a disposition on the part of the subject, because in that manner the discourse would be incongruous: ergo etc..

2. Likewise, this very (thing)[3] seems through *exposition*: the Trinity is 'God and not other than God', therefore the Trinity is God alone [solus Deus]; the premises are true: therefore also the conclusion.

3. Likewise, it seems from reason through a *simile*: when the predicate is not in an

vere haec dictio *solus* accipitur ex parte subiecti: ergo quando subiectum non subest alii quam praedicato, vere accipitur a parte praedicati; sed istud subiectum *Trinitas* non subest[4] alii quam Deo: ergo etc.

other than the subject, truly this saying "*solus*" is accepted on the part of the subject; therefore when a subject is not (logically) beneath [non subest] an other than the predicate, truly it is accepted on the part of the predicate; but this subject "*Trinity*" is not (logically) beneath[4] an other than "God": ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Haec dictio *solus* est dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; sed quando *omnis* additur ad praedicatum, locutio est falsa et impropria: ergo et[5] similiter, quando haec dictio *solus*.

2. Item, haec dictio *solus* addita alicui termino excludit alium; unde sensus est: *solus homo*, id est[6] homo et non alius; sed *alius* respicit suppositum, et terminus subiicitur ratione suppositi, et praedicatur ratione formae: ergo haec dictio *solus* de sui ratione respicit subiectum: ergo falso et improprie additur praedicato.

On the contrary: 1. This saying "*solus*" is a disposition of a subject, just as this (logical) sign "*all*"; but when "*all*" is added to a predicate, the expression [locutio] is false and improper: therefore also[5] similarly, when this saying "*solus*" is added.

2. Likewise, this saying "*solus*", added to any term, excludes another (person); whence the sense is: '*the man alone*', that is,[6] 'the man and not another (man)'; but "*another*" looks-back to the supposit, and the term is subjected by reason of the supposit, and is predicated by reason of a form: therefore this saying "*solus*" of its own reckoning looks-back to the subject: therefore as a false (term) and improperly is it added to a predicate.

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[1] Cap. 9. n. 10; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.

[2] Libr. II. c. 9. n. 1: Unus enim et solus Deus a nobis ipsa Trinitas praedicatur. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. circa finen. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. *ly solus* pro *in hac solus Deus*. Per verba, quae dein sequuntur, scil. *sermo incongruus*, intellige sermonem contra grammaticae regulas.

[3] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *ipsum*.

[4] Postulantibus codd. cum ed. 1 nec non contextu, posuimus *subest* loco *inest*.

[5] In Vat. deest particula *et*, quae tamen a multis mss. ut A F G T Y etc. et ed. 1 exhibetur.

[6] Vat. cum cod. cc omittit minus bene, et aliis mss. cum ed. 1 obnitentibus, *id est*. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ut S Y Z post *excludit* repetunt *terminum*.

[1] Chapter 9, n. 10; see here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2. [Trans. note: cf. the text of Master Peter's XXI distinction, Translator's note on the use of *alone* and *the only* for the rationale used in the English translation for each term.]

[2] Book II, ch. 9, n. 1: For the one and only God is by preached by us (to be) the Trinity Itself. See also the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2 near the end. — Next the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads *the word "solus"* [ly solus] for *in this (saying) "the only God"* [in hac solus Deus]. Through the words which follows, namely *the discourse would be incongruous* [esset sermo incongruus], understand: that the discourse would be contrary to the rules of grammar.

[3] From very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *very (thing)* [ipsum]. [Trans. note: Here the English translation renders *solus Deus* as *God alone*, on account of the rationale "God and not another than God", which is used to explain the sense of *solus Deus* as *God alone* here in q. 1, 1st. argument of the fundament, and in the 4th argument of the contrary, below in this q.; and which renders this argument here in favor of an exclusive term applied to a substantial predicate, rather than *alone God*, which would support the argument of its application to a substantial subject.]

[4] As required by the codices together with edition 1, and also the context, we have put *is (logically) beneath* [subest] for *is in* [in est]. [Trans. note: here *logically beneath*, means *a supposit of the genus of*.]

[5] In the Vatican edition there is lacking the particle *also* [et], which, however, is exhibited by many

manuscripts, such as A F G T Y etc., and edition 1.
[6] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, omits less well *that is* [id est]. A little before this some codices, such as S Y and Z, after *excludes* [excludit] reads *another term* [terminum alium]. [Trans. note: which alternate reading is faulty because as is seen in this argument and in St. Bonaventure's reply, the sense of *alium* here is *another person*, as is gathered from the masculine form of the adjective used here and in the reply.]

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3. Item, secundum quod additur praedicato, aut tenetur categorematice, aut[1] syncategorematice. Si categorematice, tunc est nomen adiectuvum et non recipitur in divinis; si syncategorematice, sic importat negationem implicitam; sed negatio antecedit quod negat: ergo necesse est, quod antecedat compositionem, quam negat; sed cum dicitur: Pater est solus Deus, solus[2] sequitur compositionem: ergo videtur, quod non possit ipsam negare: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, according to which it is added to a predicate, it is either held categorically, or[1] co-categorically. If categorically, then it is an adjectival name (i.e. as in "a lone God" [solus Deus]) and is not received into the divine; if co-categorically, in this manner it conveys an implicit negation; but a negation antecedes what it negates: therefore it is necessary, that it antecede the composition, which it negates; but when there is said 'Pater est solus Deus', solus[2] follows the composition: therefore it seems, that (there) it cannot negate it: ergo etc..

4. Item, ego quaero, quid excludat,[3] quando additur ad praedicatum. Si aliud a praedicato, ut sit sensus: *est solus Deus*, id est Deus et non aliud; tunc est ibi superfluitas, quia forma praedicati excludit aliam formam disparatam, quantum est de se — unde sequitur: iste est homo, ergo non est aliud ab homine — ergo videtur, quod dictio exclusiva faciat superfluitatem et nugationem: non ergo tenetur exclusive, et ita videtur, quod teneatur *adiective* solum et quod importat solitudinem circa istum[4] terminum Deus; et istae sunt falsae.

4. Likewise, I ask, what does it exclude,[3] when it is added to the predicate. If (it excludes) another from the predicate, so that the sense is: '*He is God alone*', that is 'God and not another'; then there is a superfluity there, because the form of the predicate excludes another disparate form, as much as concerns itself — whence there follows: 'that one is a man, therefore he is not other than a man' — therefore it seems, that an exclusive saying causes a superfluity and worthlessness [nugationem]: therefore it is not held exclusively, and thus it seems, that it is held only *adjectively* and that it conveys a solitude about that[4] term "God"; and these (conclusions) are false.

CONCLUSIO.

Dictio exclusiva potest in divinis addit praedicato termini substantialis vere, sed non proprie, nisi cum determinatione et adiunctione termini partitivi.

CONCLUSION

An exclusive saying can among the divine be added to a predicate of a substantial term truly, but not properly, except with a determination and adjunction of a partitive term.

Respondeo: Ad hoc volunt[5] aliqui dicere, quod haec dictio *solus* proprie non debet addi ad praedicatum, sed tantum ad subiectum; et cum additur praedicato, impropriae sunt locutiones, et tunc idem est

I respond: To this some want[5] to say, that this saying "*solus*" properly ought not be added to a predicate, but only to a subject; and when it is added to a predicate, the expressions are improper, and then it is the

dicere *solus* et *tantum*. Sed tamen, si aliquis inspiciat, non tantum cum hac dictione *solus*, sed etiam[6] cum hac dictione *tantum* videbit improprietatem et superfluitatem. Quid enim est dicere: Trinitas est tantum Deus, nisi est Deus, et non aliud quam Deus? Sed[7] hoc improprie satis dictum est, quia hoc ipso, quod Deus est, excluditur, quod non sit aliud a Deo. Si enim Deus est, ergo non est aliud a Deo, et nullus haereticus unquam dixit, Trinitatem esse Deum, qui diceret, aliud[8] esse a Deo. Unde non videtur magnum quid Augustinus dicere, si hoc voluit dicere.

same to say "*solus*" and "*only*" [tantum]. But yet, if anyone looks into it, not only with this saying "*solus*", but also[6] with this saying "*only*" will he see impropriety and superfluity. For what is it to say: 'the Trinity is only God [tantum Deus]', except 'It is God, and not another than God'? But[7] this has been said sufficiently improperly, because by this very (reason), that It is God, there is excluded, that It is not other than God. For if It is God, therefore It is not other than God, and no heretic ever said, that the Trinity is God, who said, that It[8] was other than God. Whence it does not seem that (St.) Augustine said anything great, if he wanted to say this.

Et[9] propterea aliter dicendum est, quod haec dictio *solus* dupliciter potest addi termino substantiali a parte praedicati: aut per se, aut cum termino numerali sive partitivo. *Per se* improprie additur; et si addatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum intellectum stat a parte subiecti. Idem enim est dicere: est homo albus,[10] et est albus homo. Unde sensus est: non dicimus, Patrem esse solum Deum, id est, non dicimus, solum Patrem esse Deum. Si autem aliter ponatur, videtur sermo habere superfluitatem et improprietatem, quia hoc excludit, quod excludebatur ex natura ipsius praedicati.

And[9] on this account it must be said in another manner, that this saying "*solus*" can be added in a twofold manner to a substantial term on [a] the part of a predicate: either per se, or with a numeral or partitive term. Per se it is added improperly; and if it be added according to language [secundum vocem], yet according to understanding it stands on the part of the subject. For it is the same to say: 'He is a man, a white [est homo albus]',[10] and 'He is a white man [est albus homo]'. Whence the sense is: 'we do not say, that the Father is alone God [Patrem esse solum Deum]', that is, 'we do not say, that the Father alone is God [solum Patrem esse Deum]'. But if it be posited in another manner, the discourse seems to have a superfluity and impropriety, because this (term) excludes, what was excluded from the nature of the predicate itself.

Aliquando[11] additur haec dictio *solus* termino substantiali *cum termino numerali*, sicut cum hoc termino *unus*; et tunc excludit pluralitatem, et hoc modo bene additur praedicato; et ita accipit Augustinus contra Maximinum, cum dicit: « Trinitas est unus solus verus Deus », ita quod non plures; et tunc est verus sermo et proprius et contra haereticos, qui dicebant, Trinitatem plures esse deos. Et importatur per istum terminum *solus* privatio multitudinis, et ita discretio,[12] et magis proprie dicitur de Trinitate, quod Trinitas sit unus solus Deus, quam de Patre, cum tamen possit dici de utroque, quia Pater est unus Deus, et nullus unquam dixit, Patrem esse plures; sed de Trinitate sive de tribus aliqui dixerunt; et

Sometimes[11] this saying "*solus*" is added to a substantial term *with a numeral term*, just as with this term "*one*"; and then it excludes plurality, and in this manner it is added well to a predicate; and thus (St.) Augustine accepts it Against Maximinus, when he says: « The Trinity is the one, only, True God », so that (there are) not more (gods); and then the discourse is true and proper and against the heretics, who used to say, that the Trinity is many gods. And there is conveyed through that term "*solus*" a privation of multitude, and thus a discretion,[12] and it is more properly said of the Trinity, that the Trinity is the one, only God, than of the Father, since, however, it could be said of Each, because the Father is

ideo congruentius dicitur: Trinitas est unus solus Deus. Concedendum est igitur, quod *solus* potest addi ad praedicatum termini substantialis vere in divinis, sed non proprie, nisi cum determinatione et adiunctione termini partitivi.

the One God, and no one every said, that the Father was many; but of the Trinity or of the Three (Persons) some did say (it); and for that reason there is more congruently said: ‘the Trinity is the one, only God’. It must be conceded, therefore, that “*solus*” can be truly added to the predicate of a substantial term among the divine, but not properly, unless with a determination and an adjunction of a partitive term.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *solus* est dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; dicendum, quod non est ita propria dispositio subiecti, sicut hoc signum *omnis*; quia *omnis* distribuit pro suppositis, pro quibus terminus *subiicitur*, non pro quibus[13] *praedicatur*, saltem simul sumtis; *solus* autem non solum dicitur ratione suppositi, verum etiam ratione formae, quia excludit *alium* et etiam[14] potest excludere *aliud*.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that “*solus*” is a disposition of a subject, just as this (logical) sign “*all*”; it must be said, that it is not such a proper disposition of a subject, as this (logical) sign “*all*”; because “*all*” distributes on behalf of supposits [pro suppositis], in virtue of which [pro quibus] the term *is subjected*, not in virtue of which[13] *it is predicated*, at least when (the supposits are) taken together; “*solus*”, however, not only is said by reason of the supposit, but [verum] also by reason of form, because it excludes *another* and also[14] (because) it can exclude *another*.

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[1] Cod. V addit *tenetur*. Paulo infra post *si syncategorematice* plurimi mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 addiciunt *sed*. Dein cod. T *implicat* loco *importat*.
[2] Sequimur maiorem numerum mss. ut H I M N P Q Z etc. et ed. 1 ponendo *solus*, quod aliqui codd. ut O R U omittunt, aliqui vero ut C L S Y ei substituunt *sic*, cod. T *hic*, Vat. cum cod. cc autem falso *non*. Mox cod. Z cum ed. 1, verbis transpositis, *ergo non videtur, quod possit* etc.
[3] Ed. 1 *excludit*.
[4] Antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 exigentibus, substituimus *istum* pro *hunc*, et mox post *et* expunximus additum *sic*.
[5] Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc *voluerunt*.
[6] Ex plurimus mss. ut G H I P Q Z ee ff et ed. 1 adiecimus *etiam*. Paulo infra post *Quid enim* Vat. cum cod. cc addit *aliud*, quod tamen deest in aliis codd. et ed. 1. Dein post *nisi* cod. V et ed. 1 repetunt *Trinitas*.
[7] Ope vetustiorum scriptorum supplevimus *Sed*.
[8] Ad normam mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 expunximus hic additum *ipsam*. Paulo ante cod. cc et edd. 2, 3 falso *quia* pro *qui*. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 *et ideo* loco *Unde*.
[9] Faventibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus particulam *Et*. Paulo post in mss. desiderantur verba *a parte praedicati*, certe supplenda.
[10] Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 1: Transposita vero nomina et verba idem significant, ut est albus homo, et est homo albus.
[11] Sequimur antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponendo *Aliquando* pro *Aliter*, et mox post *sicut cum* addendo *hoc*, ad dein substituendo *ita* loco *sic*.
[12] Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *distinctio*, quae et paulo post praeter fidem mss. et sex

[1] Codex V adds *is held* [tenetur]. A little below this after *if co-categorically* [si syncategorematice] very many manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6, add *but* [sed]. Then codex T has *implies* [imiplicat] for *conveys* [importat].
[2] We follow the greater number of manuscripts, such as H I M N P Q Z etc., and edition 1, by putting *solus*, which some codices, such as O R and U omit (in favor of *it* as the subject), but others, such as C L S Y substitute for it *in this manner it* [sic], codex T *here it* [hic], the Vatican edition together with codex cc reads falsely *it does not follow* [non sequitur]. Next codex Z together with edition 1, with transposed words, reads *therefore, it does not seem, that it can negate it* etc. [ergo non videtur, quod possit ipsam negare etc.].
[3] Edition 1 has the indicative *does it exclude* [excludit].
[4] As required by the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *that* [istum] for *this* [hunc], and next after *and* [et], we have expunged the added *so* [sic].
[5] The Vatican edition, together with the more recent codex cc, has *wanted* [voluerunt].
[6] From very many manuscripts, such as G H I P Q Z ee ff and edition 1, we have added *also* [etiam]. A little below this after *For what* [Quid enim], the Vatican edition, together with codex cc, adds *another* [alium], which however is lacking in the other codices and edition 1. Then after *except* [nisi] codex V and edition 1 read *the Trinity* [Trinitas] for *It*.
[7] With the help of the older writings, we have supplied *But* [Sed].
[8] According to the norm of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, we have expunged the here

primarum edd. omittit haec verba *quia Pater est unus Deus*.
[13] In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 deest *pro quibus*, e contra in codd. aa bb habetur *sed non pro illis, pro quibus*.
[14] Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *etiam*, pro quo aliqui falso exhibent *non*.

added *It* [ipsam: which does not change the English translation]. A little before this, codex cc and editions 2 and 3 falsely read *because* [quia] for *who* [qui]. Next the Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1, reads *and for that reason* [et ideo] for *Whence* [Unde].
[9] With the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 favoring it, we have restored the particle *And* [et]. A little after this in the manuscripts there is wanting the words *on the part of the predicate* [a parte predicati], which certainly are to be supplied.
[10] Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 1: But transposed nouns and verbs, such as 'the white man is' and 'the man is white', signify the same.
[11] We follow the more ancient codices and edition 1, by putting *Sometimes* [Aliquando] for *In another manner* [Aliter], and next after *just as with* [sicut cum] by adding *this* [hoc], and then by substituting *thus* [ita] for *in this manner* [sic].
[12] The Vatican edition, together with only one or the other codex, reads *distinction* [distinctio], which also a little after this, not trusting the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits these words *because the Father is the One God* [quia Pate rest unus Deus]. [Trans. note: *a discretion* is a logical separation by means of a distinction: it is distinguished from a *distinction*, in this that the latter can be either secundum re or secundum rationem whereas the former is secundum re. Cf. the "Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin terms" in the Introduction to this English translation.]
[13] In very many manuscripts and edition 1 there is lacking *in virtue of which* [pro quibus], and contrariwise in codices aa and bb there is had *but not on behalf of those, in virtue of which* [sed non pro illis, pro quibus].
[14] Not a few codices, together with edition 1, omit *also* [etiam], for which some falsely exhibit *not* [non].

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2. Et per hoc patet sequens, quia non semper excludit *alium* masculine, sed etiam potest excludere *aliud* neutraliter, vel etiam *pluralitatem*, quando additur termino numerali, ut visum est.

2. And though this the following is clear, because it does not always exclude *another* in the masculine sense [masculine], but it can also exclude *another* in the neuter sense [neutraliter], and/or even a *plurality*, when it is added to a numeral term, as has been seen.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum teneatur sycategorematice, vel categorematice,[1] prout est nomen importans formam denominantem, ut idem sit *solus* quod *solitarius*; dicendum, quod syncategorematice. Quod obiicitur, quod sequitur compositionem; dicendum, quod *solus* importat duo in se, scilicet intellectum huius nominis *alius* et intellectum negations. Quantum ad intellectum huius nominis *alius*, respicit terminum, circa quem ponitur, et sequitur actum; quantum ad

3. To that which is asked, whether it is held co-categorically, and/or categorically,[1] insofar as it is a name conveying a denominating form, so that "*solus*" is the same as "*solitary*"; it must be said, that (it is held) co-categorically. What is objected, that it follows the composition; it must be said, that "*solus*" conveys two (ideas) in itself, namely, the understanding of this name "*another*" and the understanding of a negation. As much as regard the understanding of this name "*another*", it

intellectum negationis praecedit; et hoc non est inconveniens quantum ad *diversa* praecedere et sequi. Et² hoc patet exponenti. Si enim dicam: video solum Petrum, sensus est: video Petrum et non video alium a Petro. Similiter intelligendum est in proposito.

looks back to the term, about which it is posited, and it follows the verb [actum]; as much as (it looks back) to the understanding of the negation it precedes (the verb according to understanding); and this is not unfitting as much as regards the *diverse* preceding and following. And² this is clear to the one expounding it. For if I will say: 'I see Peter alone' [video solum Petrum], the sense is: 'I see Peter and I do not see another than Peter'. Similarly it must be understood in the proposed (objection).

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid excludit, cum additur praedicato; dicendum, quod quando additur sine determinatione, excludit aliam formam; et tunc revera est ibi superfluitas et improprietas, tamen³ nihilominus veritas. Sed quando additur cum termino partitivo, tunc excludit pluralitatem; et tunc potest locutio habere viertatem. Pater enim et Filius sunt unus Deus et non plures, et ita unus solus Deus.

4. To that which is asked, what does it exclude, when it is added to a predicate; it must be said, that when it is added without a determination, it excludes another form; and then in truth there is a superfluity and impropriety there, yet³ nevertheless (also) a truth. But when it is added with a partitive term, then it excludes plurality; and then the expression can have truth. For the Father and the Son are the One God and not many (gods), and thus (are) the one, only God.

SCHOLION.

I. Prima opinio in corp. posita asserit, omnes propositiones, in quibus vocabulum *solus* ponitur ad praedicatum, esse improprias, et tunc hoc verbum *solus* aequivalere termino *tantum*. Contra hanc sententiam arguit S. Doctor, quod tunc verba S. Augustini in fundam. sint valde impropria, et quod insuper ibi sit superfluitas. Quare distinguendo duplicem modum, quo *solus* addi possit praedicato, suam propriam opinionem proponit et corroborat, quam magis explicat infra dub. 1. Aliqui tamen primum membrum distinctionis, quando *solus* per se additur praedicato, iterum distinguunt et in aliquo sensu ut proprie dictum admittunt. Ita S. Thomas (hic q. 2. a. 1.), B. Albertus et Petrus. Tamen in Summa (I. q. 31. a. 3. ad 2.) Angelicus omnes istas propositioines dicit esse improprias, « nisi forte ex parte praedicati intelligitur aliqua implicatio, ut dicatur: Trinitas est Deus, qui est solus Deus ». Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unic.) censet, quod S. Thomas in Commentario a S. Bonaventura « parumper dissentit. Videtur autem in hac reositio illa Bonaventurae planior ac aptior esse ». Hoc argumento non spernendo probare nititur.

SCHOLIUM

I. The first opinion posited in the body (of question) asserts, that all the propositions, in which the word "*solus*" is posited in the predicate, to be improper, and that then this word "*solus*" is equivalent to the term "*only*" [tantum]. Against this sentence the Seraphic Doctor argues, that then the words of St. Augustine (cited) in the fundament would be very improper, and that moreover there would be a superfluity there. How by distinguishing the twofold manner, by which "*solus*" can be added to a predicate, he propounds and corroborates his own opinion, he explains more below in dubium 1. Yet some, again, distinguish the first member of his distinction, when "*solus*" <u>per se</u> is added to a predicate, and they admit in some sense that (it has) been properly said. Thus St. Thomas (here in q. 2, a. 1), Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) and (Bl.) Peter (of Tarentaise). However in the <u>Summa</u>., I, q. 31, a. 3, in reply to n. 2, the Angelic (Doctor) says that all these propositions are improper, « unless perhaps on the part of the predicate there be understood some implication, so that there be said: 'the Trinity is the God, who is the sole God ». (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian

(here in q. sole) judges, that St. Thomas in his own Commentary from St. Bonaventure « dissents but a little. Moreover it seems in this matter that (division) of Bonaventure is more plain and more apt ». This he strives to prove by an argument that is not to be spurned.

II. Praeter citatos cfr. Aelx. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 3. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. unica, collater. 1. et 2.

II. Besides the authors cited, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 66, m. 3, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3 and 4. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole, a. 5. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 5. — Giles the Roman, here in 2nd. princ., q. sole, collateral 1 and 2.

[1] Praeferimus lectionem nonnullorum mss. ut H X aa bb in qua additur congruentius vox *categorematice*.
[2] Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Et*, et fide antiquiorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *Petrum* pro *Conradum*.
[3] Vat., obnitentibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *est* loco *tamen*.

[1] We prefer the reading of not a few manuscripts, such as H X aa and bb, in which there is more congruently added the word *categorically* [categorematice].
[2] From the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *And* [et], and trusting in the more ancient codices and edition 1 we have substituted *Peter* [Petrum] for *Conrad* [Conradum].
[3] The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 striving against this, reads *there is* [est] in place of *yet* [tamen].

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI

ARTICLE II

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 383-385.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 383-385.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino relativo

Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secundo articulo quaestionis, scilicet utrum dictio exclusiva possit addi termino relativo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Primo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.

Secundo, utrum vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis, ut vere dicatur: solus Pater est Deus.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum dictio exclusiva solus vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.

QUOD AUTEM respectu praedicati proprii vere addatur, ut scilicet haec sit vera: solus Pater est Pater, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum sexto de Trinitate:[4] « In illa Trinitate solus Pater dicitur Pater, quia nullus nisi ipse ibi est Pater ».

2. Item, hoc videtur per expositionem, quia persona est Pater, et nulla alia est Pater: ergo haec est vera: solus Pater est Pater.

3. Item, nihil est magis proprium alicui, quam quod est idem sibi re et ratione; sed Pater est idem sibi re et ratione: ergo propriisime dicitur de se; sed quod proprie convenit alicui, convenit soli:[5] ergo Pater dicitur de solo Patre.

[4] Cap. 9. n. 10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi in hoc textu pro *nullus nisi* habetur *non nisi*, cui concordant originale et cod. Z.
[5] Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.

ARTICLE II

On exclusive sayings added to a relative term.

Consequently in the second place is the question concerning the second article of the question, namely, whether an exclusive saying can be added to a relative term. And about this two (things) are asked.

First there is asked, whether an exclusive saying is added to a personal term in respect to a proper predicate.

Second, whether it is truly added to a personal term in respect to a common predicate, so that there be truly said: ‘the Father alone is God’.

QUESTION 1

Whether the exclusive saying “solus” is truly added to a personal term in respect to a proper predicate.

THAT IT IS truly added in respect to a proper predicate, so that, namely, this is true: ‘the Father alone is “the Father”’, seems:

1. Through (what St.) Augustine (says) in the sixth (book) On the Trinity:[4] « In that Trinity the Father alone is said (to be) “the Father”, because None but He is “the Father” There ».

2. Likewise, this seems through the exposition, because the Father is a Person, and no Other is the Father: therefore this is true: ‘the Father alone is “the Father”.

3. Likewise, nothing is more proper to anything, than what is the same as it in thing and reckoning [idem sibi re et ratione]; but the Father is the same to Himself in thing and reckoning: therefore (“the Father”) is most properly said of Him; but what properly convenes with anything, convenes with (it) alone: therefore “the Father” is said of the Father alone.

[4] Chapter 9, n. 10. See there the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1, where in this text there is had, in agreement with the original and codex Z, *naught but* [non nisi] for *None but* [nullus nisi],

[5] Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. "On the Proper".

Contra: 1. « *Solus*, ut vult Philosophus,[1] idem est quod *non cum alio* »; sed impossibile est, Patrem non esse cum alio: ergo semper, quando additur huic termino *Pater* vel alii termino personali, est locutio falsa.

On the contrary: 1. « "*Alone*" [solus] », as the Philosopher[1] would have it, « is the same as "*not with another*" »; but it is impossible, that the Father not be with Another: therefore, when it is added to this term "*the Father*" and/or to the personal term of another (Person), it is always a false expression.

2. Item, *solus* excludit alium; sed alio est Deus, alio est Pater:[2] ergo addita huic termino *Pater* excludit Deum: ergo si haec est vera: solus Pater est Pater, et haec similiter: Deus non est Pater; quod si haec est falsa: ergo et prima.

2. Likewise, "*solus*" excludes "another" [alium]: but by one He is "God", by another He is "the Father":[2] therefore (the exclusive saying "solus") added to this term "*the Father*" excludes "God": therefore if this is true: 'the Father alone is "the Father"', also this similarly: 'God is not "the Father"'; which if this is false: therefore also the first.

3. Item, *solus* excludit[3] hoc relativum *alius*; sed *alius* ita est relativum diversitatis, quod nihilominus implicat aliquam identitatem; unde sequitur: iste vadit cum alio homine, ergo iste est homo. Si ergo excludit alium ab hoc quod est *Pater*,[4] aut alium *Patrem*, aut alium *Deum*; sed quocumque modo dicatur, est locutio falsa et implicatio falsi: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, "*solus*" excludes[3] this relative (adjective/pronoun) "*alius*" [alius], but thus "*alius*" is a relative (adjective) of diversity, which nevertheless implies some identity; whence it follow: 'this one [iste] goes with another [alio] man, therefore this one is a man.' If, therefore, ("solus" as a relative pronoun) excludes "alius" from that which is "*the Father*",[4] either the one [alium] (is) "*the Father*", or the other [alium] "*God*"; but in whatsoever manner it be said, the expression is false and an implication of (something) false: ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

Terminus solus in divinis recte dicitur respectu praedicati proprii, quatenus exclusit associationem tum respectu formae termini subiecti, tum respectu praedicati, sive in participando, sive in comparticipando.

CONCLUSION

The term "solus" among the divine is rightly said in respect to a proper predicate, to the extent it excludes association both in respect to the form of the subject term, and in respect to the predicate, whether in participating, or in co-participating.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod haec dictio *solus* tenetur sycategorematice, importat privationem associationis; et locutio simpliciter est vera, excluso illo sensu, quo importat solitudinem, quia sic non accipitur in divinis, sicut supra dictum est.[5]

I respond: It must be said, that according to which this saying "*solus*" is held co-categorically, it conveys a privation of association; and the expression is simply true, having excluded that sense, whereby it conveys solitude, because in this manner it is not accepted among the divine, just as has been said above.[5]

Secundum enim quod importat privationem associationis, vera est, quia, cum tripliciter possit eam importare, in quolibet sensu

For according to which it conveys a privation of association, it is true, because, since it can convey this in a threefold

locutio est vera. Potest enim haec dictio *solus* importare privationem associationis respectu *formae termini subiecti*,[6] ut dicatur *solus Pater*, id est, ille qui est solus Pater; et sic absque dubio veritatem habet: solus Pater est Pater. Vel potest importare privationem associationis respectu *praedicati*, et hoc dupliciter: vel in *participando*, ut quia alii non conveniat; et adhuc vera est, quia hoc praedicatum quod est *Pater* soli personae Patris convenit; illa enim proprietas Patri convenit, ita[7] quod nulli alii; vel potest importare privationem associationis in *comparticipando*, ut cum dicitur: Petrus comedit solus, vel vadit Roman solus, non quia alius non vadat[8] Roman, vel non comedat, sed quia nullus comparticipat cum eo, quamvis participet; et sic adhuc locutio est vera, quia persona Patris non partcipat vel comparticipat cum alia in proprietate paternitatis. Et ideo, secundum quod *solus* exclusive tenetur, iudicatur locutio vera.

manner, in any sense the expression is true. For this saying "*solus*" can convey a privation of association in respect to the *form of a subject term*,[6] so that there is said "*the Father alone*" [solus Pater], that is, "He who is the Father alone"; and in this manner it has without doubt truth: 'the Father alone is "the Father"'. And/or it can convey a privation of association in respect to a *predicate*, and this in a twofold manner: either in *participating*, such as because it does not convene with another; and it is still true, because this predicate which is "*the Father*" convene with only the Person of the Father; for that property convenes with the Father, such[7] that (it does) with no other; and/or it can convey a privation of association in *co-participating*, as when there is said: 'Peter eats alone and/or goes to Rome alone' [Petrus comedit solus vel vadit Roman solus], not because another does not go[8] to Rome, and/or does not eat, but because no one is a co-participant with him, though he does participate; and in this manner the expression is still true, because the Person of the Father does not participate and/or co-participate with another (Person) in the property of the paternity. And for that reason, according to which "*solus*" is held exclusively, the expression is judged true.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod *solus* idem est quod *non cum alio*; dicendum, quod negatio illa non simpliciter excludit alium in coexistendo, sed excludit alium respectu formae subiecti vel praedicati,[9] ut visum est. Et quamvis Pater cum alio existat et non possit sine alio esse, quia tamen proprietatem paternitatis cum alio non communicat, ideo habet simpliciter locutio veritatem.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that "*solus*" is the same as "*not with another*"; it must be said, that that negation does not simply exclude another in co-existing, but (rather) excludes another in respect to the form of the subject and/or predicate;[9] as has been seen. And although the Father does exist with Another and cannot be without Another, yet because He does not communicate the property of the paternity with Another, for that reason the expression has truth simply (speaking).

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est saepe,[10] *alius* dicit diversitatem secundum rationem dicendi vel intelligendi in verbo proposito; sed in expositionie huius dictionis *solus* dicit diversitatem sive distinctionem in supposito. Et quia Deus[11] in supposito non differt a Patre, immo supponit pro Patre; ideo non sequitur, quod dictio exclusiva addita Patri excludat Deum.

2. To that which is objected, that by one He is "God", by another He is "the Father"; it must be said, that just as it has been said often,[10] "*alius*" means a diversity according to the reckoning of speaking and/or understanding in the proposed word; but in the exposition of this saying "*solus*" it means a diversity or distinction in the supposit. And because "God"[11] in (its) supposit does not differ from "the Father", nay supposes on behalf of "the Father"; for

that reason it does not follow, that an exclusive saying added to "the Father" excludes "God".

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod *alius* implicat formam aliquam, secundum quam conveniat;[12] dicendum, quod istud non oportet, quod ista sit forma per terminum importata — vere enim dicitur: homo est aliud ab asino — nisi quando advenit illi termino immediate, ut cum dicitur *alius asinus*, includitur convenientia in natura communi. Sed cum dicitur: solus *Pater*, non est dicere, quod *Pater* . . .

3. To that which is objected last, that "*alius*" implies some form, according to which it convenes (with the term it modifies);[12] it must be said, that this is not necessary [istud non oportet], that it be a form conveyed through the term (it modifies) — for there truly said: 'a man is (something) other than an donkey [aliud ab asino]' — unless when it comes to that term immediately (proximate), as when there is said '*another donkey*" [alius asinus], it includes a convening in a common nature. But when there is said: 'the Father alone' (this) is not to say, that '*the Father . . .*

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[1] Libr. II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut T V Y *cum* pro *quando*.
[2] August., VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11. et Sermo 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5. Videsis supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4. — Mox post *addita* supple: dictio exclusiva *solus*, vel adde cum cod. aa *haec dictio* in principio argumenti post *Item*; minus congruam censuimus correctionem in cod. T a posteriori manu factam, qua scil. post *addita* subiungitur *dictione exclusiva*.
[3] Communissimam mss. et primarum edd. (excepta ed. 1) lectionem, qua habetur *includit*, licet in se spectata possit explicari (cfr. resp. ad 3. praec. q.), consideranto tamen fine argumenti, minus aptam et incompletam iudicamus. Paulo infra post primum *ergo* cod. W addit particulam *et*.
[4] Cod. V *termino Pater* pro *quod est Pater*, qui et mox post *dicatur* addiicit *semper*. Dein ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *falsi* pro *falsa*.
[5] Hic, a. 1. q. 1.
[6] In permultis codd. minus bene deest *subiecti*, melius in cod. X, omisso *termini*, retinetur *subiecti*.
[7] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus particulam *et*, quae in Vat. verbo *ita* praefigitur.
[8] Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primarum edd., *eat*; plures tamen mss. hic *vadit* et paulo infra *comedit*.
[9] Ed. 1 cum Vat. addit *in comparticipando*, quod tamen abest a mss. et aliis quinque primis edd. Mox post *cum* Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 propter subnexa minus congrue *aliis* pro *alio*, loco cuius pauci codd. ut S Y Z exhibent *Filio*.
[10] Dist. 6. dub. 2, et praesertim d. 19. p. II. a. 2. ad 4. — Vat. cum uno alterove codic *supra* pro *saepe*, et contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 *aliud* loco *alius*.
[11] In cod. T adiungitur *cum Patre nullam dicit distinctionem*.
[12] Pauci codd. ut Y cc *communicat*. Mox cod. Y *illud* pro *istud*.

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[1] On the Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 22). — A little below this not a few codices, such as T V and Y, read *when* [cum] for *when* [quando].
[2] (St.) Augustinis, On the Trinity, Bk. VII, ch. 6, n. 11, and Sermon 1, on Psalm 68, n. 5. See above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, in reply to n. 4. — Next to *added* [addita] supply *the exclusive saying "solus"* [dictio eclusiva], and/or add together with codex aa *this saying* [haec dictio] at the beginning of the argument after *Likewise* [Item]; we judge to be less congruous the correction made in codex T by a later hand, by which, namely, there is read *with an exclusive saying added . . . it excludes God* [addita dictione exclusive etc.].
[3] We judge the most common reading of the manuscriptsa and of the editions (except edition 1), by which there is had *includes* [includit], though considered in itself it can be explained (cf. response to n. 3, in the preceding question), yet having considered the end of this argument, is less apt and incomplete. A little below this after the first *therefore* [ergo], codex W adds the particle *also* [et].
[4] Codex V has *term "the Father"* [termino Pater] for *which is "the Father"* [quod est Pater], which also next after *it be* [dicatur] adds *always* [semper]. Then from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *an implication of (something) false* [implication falsi] for *the implication false* [implication falsa].
[5] Here in a. 1, q. 1.
[6] In very many codices, there is lacking less well *subiect* [subiecti], better in codex X, where having omitted *term* [termini], *subiect* [subiecti] is retained.
[7] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, we have deleted the particle *and* [et], which in the Vatican term had been prefixed to *such* [ita].
[8] The Vatican edition, breaking with the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads *go* [eat]; yet very many manuscripts read here *go* [vadit] and a little below his *eat* [comedit] (in the indicative).
[9] Edition 1, together with the Vatican edition, adds *in co-participating* [in comparticipando], which however is absent from the manuscripts and from the other

five first editions. Next after *with* [cum] the Vatican edition, not trusting in very many codices and editions 1, 2 and 3, on account of what follows puts *Others* [aliis] for *Another* [alio], in place ofwhich a few codices, such as S Y and Z, exhibit *the Son* [Filio].
[10] Distinction 6, dubium 2, and chiefly d. 19, p. II, a. 2, in reply to n. 4. — The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has *above* [supra] for *often* [supra], and contrary to all the codices and edition 1, has *alium* in the place of *alius*.
[11] In codex T there is added *with "the Father" means no distinction* [cum Patre nullam dicit distinctionem].
[12] A few codices, such as Y and cc, read *it communicates* [communicat]. Next codex Y has *it* [illud] for *it* [istud]. [Trans. note: each of which refer with emphasis (though the second with more) to what follows *necessary*.]

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et non alius Pater, sed *Pater et non alius a Patre*; et ideo non importatur convenientia in forma proprietatis paternitatis cum alietate, sed sufficit, quod sit alia persona — Pater enim est[1] persona — vel etiam alia essentia: et illa excludit hoc quod est *solus*; et sic patet illud.

and not another Father', but '*the Father and not another than the Father*'; and for that reason there is not conveyed a convening in the form of the property of the paternity with anotherness, but it is sufficient, that there be another Person — for the Father is a[1] Person — and/or even another essence: and that (saying "alius") excludes this which is "*alone*" [solus]; and thus that is clear.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro intelligentia 3. oppositi et solut. eiusdem notandum primo, quod terminus *alius* poetst importare distinctionem vel circa formam (alium *Deum*), vel circa suppositum (alium *Patrem*). Secundo, *alius* potest addi alicui termino vel immediate vel mediante aliqua propositione, ut exemplo in textu illustratur. In primo casu ponit identitatem specificam inter extrema; in secundo vero casu haec identitas non importatur.

II. Auctores in substantia solutionis non dissentiunt. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1, quaestiunc. 2 . — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.

SCHOLIUM

I. For an understanding of the 3rd argument of the Contrary and its solution, it must be noted first, that the term "*alius*" can convey a distinction either about a form (as in 'another *God*'), and/or about a supposit (as in 'another *Father*'). Second, "*alius*" can be added to any term either immediately and/or by means of some proposition, as illustrated by the example in the text. In the first case it posits a specific identity between the extremes; but in the second case it does not convey this identity.

II. The authors (cited here) do not dissent in the substance of the solution. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middl eton, here in q. 2.

[1] Vat. cum solo cod. cc hic repetit *alia*. Mox ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *illa* pro *ista*.

[1] The Vatican edition, with codex cc alone, here repeats *another* [alia]. Next from very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substitued *that (saying "alius")* [illa] for *this (other essence) of His* [ista].

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translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

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S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 385-386.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 385-386.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum dictio exclusiva solus vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis.

Secundo quaertur, utrum dictio exclusiva vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati[2] communis, ut vere dicatur: solus Pater est Deus. Et quod sic, videtur *auctoritate* et *ratione*.

1. *Auctoritate* sic: Ecclesia cantat: « Tu solus altissimus, Iesu Christe »:[3] et illud: « Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio », et consimiles multae inveniuntur.

2. Item, Matthaei undecimo:[4] *Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*; sed *nemo nisi Pater* et *solus Pater* convertuntur: ergo solus Pater novit, et hoc praedicatum est essentiale:

QUESTION 2

Whether the exclusive saying "solus" is truly added to a personal term in respect to a common predicate.

Second there is asked, whether an exclusive saying is truly added to a personal term in respect to a common predicate,[2] so that there is truly said: the Father alone is God. And that (it is) so, is seen *by authority* and *by reason*.

1. *By authority* in this manner: the Church sings: « Thou alone the Most High, Jesus Christ » [Tu solus altissimus, Iesus Christe]:[3] and that: « to God the Father be the glory and to His only Son » [Deo Patri sit gloria, eiusque soli Filio], and many completely similar (verses) are found.

2. Likewise, in the eleventh (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew:[4] *No one knows the Son but the Father*; but "*no one but the Father*" and "*the Father alone*" are

ergo etc.

convertible [solus Pater convertuntur]: therefore "the Father alone knows", and this predicate (i.e. "knows") is essential: ergo etc..

3. Item, *ratione* videtur, quia dictio exclusiva addita alicui non excludit nisi alium; sed tres pesonae non habent alietatem respectu praedicati substantialis: ergo addita uni non excludit aliam respectu talis praedicati; sed si non excludit, locutio est vera: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, *by reason* it seems, because an exclusive saying added to anything does not exclude but another; but the Three Persons do not have an anotherness in respect to a substantial predicate: therefore with it added to One, it does not exclude Another in respect to such a predicate; but if it does not exclude, the expression is true: ergo etc..

4. Item, dictio exclusiva addita alicui non excludit quod est in eo ut *pars*, ut addita[5] Petro non excludit pedem Petri: ergo cum maiori identitate sit Filius in Patre quam pes in Petro, addita Patri, non excludit Filium.

4. Likewise, an exclusive saying added to anything does not exclude what is in it as a *part*, such as added[5] to "Peter", it does not exclude "Peter's foot": therefore since the Son is in the Father by a greater identity than a foot (is) in Peter, with it added to "the Father", it does not exclude "the Son".

Contra: 1. Nec Pater solus nec Filius solus nec Spiritus sanctus solus Deus est: ergo non vere additur respectu termini communis.

2. Item, omnis propositio, in qua praedicatum communis est subiecto, addita exclusione ad subiectum, est falsa, quia nullum tale praecise convenit subiecto: sed talis est haec et consimiles: solus Pater est Deus: ergo etc.

3. Item, dictio exclusiva addita alicui excludit omne illud quod ponit associationem cum termino; et hoc patet, quia privat associationem; sed Filius ponit associationem cum Patre: unde *Pater cum Filio* est *Pater cum alio*.

4. Item, dictio exclusiva excludit omne aliud, et maxime oppositum; sed relativa sunt una differentia oppositionis;[6] ergo addita uni relativo excludit aliud: ergo addita Patri excludit Filium; et si hoc, omnes tales sunt falsae.

On the contrary: 1. Neither "the Father alone" nor "the Son alone" nor "the Holy Spirit alone" is "God": therefore it is not truly added in respect to a common term.

2. Likewise, every proposition, in which the predicate is common to the subject, with an exclusion added to the subject, is false, because no such convenes precisely with the subject: but such is this (saying) and (those) completely similar: 'the Father alone is God': ergo etc..

3. Likewise, an exclusive saying added to anything excludes everything which posits an association with the term; and this is clear, because it deprives association; but the Son posits an association with the Father: whence "*the Father with the Son*" is "*the Father with Another*".

4. Likewise, an exclusive saying excludes every other, and most of all the opposite; but relatives are one by difference of (their) opposition;[6] therefore added to one relative (term) it excludes the other: therefore added to "the Father" it excludes "the Son"; and if this, all such (expressions) are false.

CONCLUSIO.

Dictio exclusiva addita termino personali respectu praedicati communis tunc admitti potest, si removet formam subiecti ab aliis; non vero, si removet formam praedicati.

CONCLUSION

An exclusive saying added to a personal term in respect to a common predicate can then be admitted, if it removes the form of the subject from others; but not, if it removes the form of the predicate.

Respondeo: Dicendum,[7] quod hic est

I respond: It must be said, that[7] here

duplex positio. Quidam enim simpliciter et sine distinctione concedunt has et consimiles: solus Pater est Deus; et positio eorum est, quod dicito exclusiva addita uni relativorum non excludit reliquum. Et ratio huius positionis est, quia[8] non excludit quod consequitur ad terminum et intelligitur in termino, ut addita homini non excludit animal. Sed unum relativorum intelligitur in altero et consequitur ad alterum: ergo addita uni non excludit alterum. Et si opponatur, quod *solus* excludit oppositum, dicunt, quod relativa et[9] sunt differentiae *oppositionis* et *entis*: *oppositionis*, secundum quod ad *idem*; et . . .

there is a twofold position. For certain ones concede simply and without distinction these (expressions) and (those) completely similar: 'the Father alone is God'; and their position is, that an exclusive saying added to one of the relatives does not exclude the rest. And the reason for this position is, that (an exclusive saying)[8] does not exclude what is consequent to the term and (what) is understood in the term, such as added to "man" it does not exclude "animal". But one of the relatives is understood in the other and is consequent to the other: therefore added to one, it does not exclude the other. And if it is opposed, that "*alone*" [solus] excludes the opposite, they say, that there are relatives belong both[9] to a difference of *opposition* and *of being* [entis]: *of opposition*, according to which (they are compared) to *the same*; and . . .

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[2] In plurimis mss. deest *praedicati*, pro quo cod. X cum ed. 1 *termini*, sed contra praedeterminata in exordio huius articuli.
[3] In hymno angelico: *Gloria in excelsis Deo* etc. — Proxime sequens stropha invenitur in Breviario Romano in fine hymni ad Primam.
[4] Vers. 27.
[5] Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 *ut si dictio exclusiva additur*, et paulo infra participio *addita* praefigit *dictio exclusiva*.
[6] Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. — Mox maior pars codd. pro *aliud* ponit *alium*, in qua lectione in voce *relativo* subaudias *terminum*.
[7] Ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *Dicendum, quod*.
[8] Subaudi: dictio exclusiva. Paulo infra, postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, post *et consequitur* adiecimus praepositionem* *ad*.
[9] In Vat. deest *et*, quod tamen a mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 exhibetur. Paulo infra post *idem* codd. O Z addunt *referuntur*, codd. I aa bb cum ed. 1 *comparantur*. Dein post *addita* supple: dictio exclusiva *solus*. Hinc errat Vat. paulo post contra mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *excludant* loco *excludit*.

[2] In very many manuscripts there is lacking *predicate* [praedicati], in place of which codex X, together with edition 1, has *term* [termini], but contrary to what has been predetermined in the exordium of this article.
[3] In the hymn of the Angels: *Gloria in excelsis Deo* etc.. — The next following strophe is found in the (traditional) Breviarium Romanum, at the end of the hymn for Prime. [Trans. note: Which hymn begins, *Iam lucis orto sidere*.]
[4] Verse 27.
[5] The Vatican edition, contrary to the codices and edition 1, has *such as that if an exclusive saying is added* [ut si diction exclusive additur], and a little below this, before the (perfect) participle *added* it adds *an exclusive saying* [diction exclusiva].
[6] Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. "On Opposites". — Next a greater part of the codices have *another (Person)* [alium] for *the other (term)* [aliud], in which reading in the word *relative* [relativo] understand *term* [terminum].
[7] From the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *It must be said, that* [Dicendum, quod].
[8] Understand: an exclusive saying. A little below this, as asked for by very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have inserted after *and consequently* [et consequitur] the preposition* *to* [ad].
[9] In the Vatican edition there is lacking *both* [et], which however is exhibited by the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 and 6. A little below this after *the same* [idem], codices O and Z read *they are referred ad to the same* [ad idem referuntur], codices I aa and bb, together with edition 1 *they are compared to the same* [ad idem comparantur]. Then by *added* [addita] understand: 'the exclusive saying "solus" added'. Hence the Vatican edition errs a little after this, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, by putting *they exclude* [excludant] in place of *it excludes* [exludit].

* [Trans. note: hic nota originalis legivit perperam *propositionem*.]

* [Trans. note: here the original footnote of the Critical Edition faultily read *proposition*.]

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sic addita uni excludit aliud; unde sequitur: iste est tantum Pater, ergo non est Filius. Secundum[1] quod ad *diversos* comparantur, sunt differentiae *entis*; et sic posito uno, ponitur et reliquum; et ideo unum non excluditur ab alio, quia dictio exclusiva illud[2] solum aliud excludit, quod non necessario concomitatur.

in this manner (the exclusive saying "solus") added to one, it excludes the other; whence it follows: 'this One is only the Father, therefore He is not the Son'. According to which[1] they are compared to *diverse* (things), (relatives) belong to a difference *of being*; and in this manner with One posited, there is posited also the Rest; and for that reason One is not excluded by the Other, because an exclusive saying excludes only that[2] other, which is not necessarily concomitant.

Sed haec positio non videtur conveniens. Dictio enim exclusiva privat associationem: ergo excludit omne illud quod ponit circa ipsam associationem; et ideo addita Patri excludit Filium.

But this position does not seem fitting. For an exclusive saying deprives association: therefore it excludes every 'that' which posits (anything) about that association; and for that reason, added to "the Father", it excludes "the Son".

Et propter hoc alia est opinio, quod dictio exclusiva addita Patri excludit Filium; et haec positio magis est probabilis. Secundum hanc positionem procedendo, distinguendae sunt huiusmodi locutiones, secundum quod distinguit Augustinus, et Magister tangit;[3] quia *solus* potest facere exclusionem respectu compositionis intellectae circa *subiectum*, vel respectu compositionis *principalis*. Si primo modo, tunc est sensus: *solus Pater est Deus*, id est ille qui solus est Pater, est Deus; et tunc removet formam termini *subiecti* ab aliis, non formam *praedicati*; et sub hoc sensu verae sunt omnes. Et sub hoc sensu accipit Augustinus:[4] « Solus Spiritus sanctus est tantus, quantus est Pater et Filius ».

And on this account there is another opinion, that an exclusive saying added to "the Father" excludes "the Son"; and this position is more probable. Proceeding according to this position, expressions of this kind are to be distinguished, according to which (St.) Augustine distinguishes (them), and Master (Peter) touches upon;[3] because "*solus*" can cause an exclusion in respect to the composition understood about a *subject*, and/or in respect to the *principal* composition. If in the first manner, then the sense is: '*the Father alone is God*', that is, 'He who is alone the Father, is God'; and then it removes the form of the *subject* term from the Others, not the form of the *predicate*; and under this sense they are true. And under this sense (St.) Augustine accepts ("solus"):[4] « The Holy Spirit alone is as much, as is the Father and the Son ».

Si autem faciat exclusionem respectu *principalis* compositionis, locutio est falsa, et omnes[5] falsae sunt, proprie loquendo, nisi addatur determinatio, ut arcteтur exclusio, ut patet, cum dicitur: « To solus altissimus, Iesu Christe, cum sancto Spiritu ». Similiter: « Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio » etc.[6]

On the other hand, if it causes an exclusion in respect to the *principal* composition, the expression is false, and all[5] are false, properly speaking, if there is not added a determination, to constrain the exclusion, as is clear, when there is said: « Thou alone the Most High, Jesus Christ, with the Holy Spirit ». Similarly: « To God the Father be the glory and to His only Son » etc..[6]

1. Et sic patet primum.

1. And in this manner the first (objection) is clear.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod solus Pater aequipollet huic: *nemo nisi Pater*; dicendum, quod falsum est; quia *nemo* distribuit pro natura, non pro persona;[7] *solus* autem additur termino personali, ideo excludit personam; ideo proprie loquendo, haec est falsa: solus Pater novit Filium, quamvis haec sit vera: *nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*, quia sensus est: *nemo*, id est nulla natura,[8] nisi ille qui est eiusdem naturae, ut Pater.

2. To that which is objected second, that 'the Father alone' [solus Pater] is equipollent to this: "*no one but the Father*" [nemo nisi Pater]; it must be said, that it is false, because "*no one*" distributes on behalf of the Nature, not on behalf of a Person;[7] but "*alone*" is added to the personal term, for that reason it excludes a Person; for that reason properly speaking, this is false: 'the Father alone knows the Son', although this is true: "*no one knows the Son but the Father*", because the sense is: '*no one*', that is 'no nature,[8] except Him who is of the same Nature, as the Father'.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dictio exclusiva excludit alium; dicendum, quod excludit omne *aliud* vel *alium*, quod non praedicatur nec subiicitur, sed associatur, sive sit aliud in forma, sive in supposito. Et quoniam Pater cum Filio respectu praedicati substantialis associatur,[9] ideo respectu illius excluduntur invicem; et quia *pars* non associatur, ideo non excluditur. Unde identitas maior vel minor nihil facit ad exclusionem, sed ratio associandi vel non associandi. Et si obiiciat,[10] quod addita definito non excludit definitionem, et antecedenti, non excludit consequens; breviter dicendum, quod si consequens ita sequitur, quod non ponat associationem, et definitio non claudat in se diversum, tunc non excludit. Si vero aliter est, tunc excludit, et contradictorie opposita implicantur in antecedente: unde hic implicatur contradictio: tantum Pater est. Huic autem positioni concordat Augustinus,[11] qui negat hanc: solus Pater est Deus, et consimiles.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that an exclusive saying excludes another; it must be said, that it excludes every *other (thing)* [aliud] and/or *other (person)* [alius], which is not predicated or subjected, but is associated, whether it be another in form, or in supposit. And since the Father is associated[9] with the Son in respect to a substantial predicate, for that reason in respect to that They exclude one another [excluduuntur invicem]; and because *a part* is not associated, for that reason it is not excluded. Whence a greater and/or lesser identity causes nothing regarding exclusion, but the reckoning of being associated and/or of not being associated (does). And if one objects,[10] that (an exclusive saying) added to a defined (term) does not exclude the definition, and to an antecedent (term), it does not exclude a consequent; it briefly must be said, that if the consequent thus follows, that it does not posit an association, and the definition does not enclose [claudat] in itself (something) diverse, then it does not exclude. However, if it its otherwise, then it does exclude, and opposites are contradictorily implied in the antecedent: whence here a contradiction is implied: 'only the Father is'. But with this position (St.) Augustine[11] agrees, who denies this (proposition): 'the Father alone is God' and (those) completely similar.

SCHOLION.

I. In solut. ad 3. 4. iterum obiicitur: « Quod dictio exclusiva addita definito non excludit definitionem, et antecedenti, non excludit consequens ». Ad hoc S. Bonav. respondet cum distinctione. Quando consequens est de ratione antecedentis, sicut risibile sequitur ut *proprium* ad *homo*, et definitio

SCHOLIUM

I. In the solution to n. 3 and 4, there is again objected: « That an exclusive saying added to a defined (term) does not exclude the definition, and to an antecedent, does not exclude the consequent ». To this St. Bonaventure responds with a distinction. When the consequent is from the reckoning

est de ratione definiti, ita ut nihil reale addat, sicut animal est de ratione hominis, tunc obiectio conceditur. Nam additio exclusiva *solus* addita homini non excludit nec *animal* nec *risibile*, unde non sequitur: solus homo currit, ergo risibile (animal) non currit. Quando vero inter utrumque in utroque casu est distinctio realis, sicuti est inter patrem creatum ut antecedens eiusque filium ut consequens, tunc dictio exclusiva addita antecedenti excludit consequens. In Deo etiam « etsi Pater et Filius sunt eiusdem essentiae, tamen Filius non est de ratione Patris sub ratoine, qua Pater est ». Ita Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. ad 3.

II. In sententia principali omnes doctores conveniunt. Sed iterum S. Thomas in Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2) et Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3) aliquam distinctionem aliam adhibent, sicut in praecedenti quaestione. Volunt enim, quod si *alius* intelligatur neutraliter, tunc « nec Filius nec Spiritus sanctus excluditur », et ideo vera est locutio « solus Pater est Deus ». Sed satis sit de hic subtilitatibus. — Alex. Hal. , S. p. I. q. 66. m. 3. a. 1. — S. Thom., loc. cit. et S. I. q. 31. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 2. 5. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3 — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

of the antecedent, just as "risible" follows as (something) *proper* to *man*, and the definition is from the reckoning of the defined, such that it adds nothing real, just as "animal" is from the reckoning of "man", then the objection is conceded. For the exclusive addition "*solus*" added to "man" does not exclude, neither "*animal*" nor "*risible*", when there does not follow: 'a man alone runs, therefore a risible (animal) does not run'. However, when among each in each case there is a real distinction, just as is among a created father as an antecedent, and his son as a consequent, then the exclusive saying added to the antecedent excludes the consequent. In God also « even if the Father and the Son are of the same Essence, yet "the Son" is not from the reckoning of "the Father" under the reckoning, whereby He is "the Father" », thus Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3, in reply to n. 3.

II. In the principal sentence all the doctors agree. But St. Thomas in his Commentary (here in q. 1, a. 2) and (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 1, a. 3) again employ some other distinction, just as in the preceding question. For they want, that if "*another*" [alius] (cf. arguments 3 and 4 throughout this question) is understood in the neuter (i.e. as referring to a discrete being), then « neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is excluded », and for that reason this expression is true: « the Father by Himself is God » [solus Pater est Deus]. But let this suffice concerning the subtleties here. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 66, m. 3, a. 1. — St. Thomas, loc. cit., and Summa., I, q. 31, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2 and 5. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3. — Giles (the Roman), here in 1st. princ, q. 2.

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[1] In paucis codd. ut P Q additur *autem*.
[2] Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus *illud* pro *illa*, in qua Vaticanae lectione consequenter particula *solum* consideratur ut dictio exclusiva, de qua est quaestio, ideoque et litteris italicis exhibetur, sed minus bene. Paulo ante Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, perperam omittit *ideo*.
[3] Hic, in lit. c. 1, ubi et verba Augustinis habentur.
[4] Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9; vide supra d. XIX. lit. Magistri, c. 12. — Paulo ante post *Et* plurimis codd. cum ed. 1 addunt *sic*.
[5] In cod. M addicitur *tales*.
[6] In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur propositio haec:

[1] In a few codices, such as P and Q, there is added *however* [autem].
[2] From the manuscripts and the six first editions, we have substituted *an exclusive saying excludes only that other* [diction exclusive illud solum aliud excludit] for *that exclusive saying "alone" excludes "the other"* [dictio exclusiva illa solum aliud excludit], in which the reading of the Vatican edition consequently considered the particle *alone* [solum] is considered as the exclusive saying, concerning which the question is, and for that reason exhibits it with italicized letters, but less well. A little before this the Vatican edition, with the more ancient manuscripts

Similiter: Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio etc., quae autem exstat in ceteris mss. et ed. 1.
[7] Explicationem horum verborum vide infra dub. 3.
[8] Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *creatura*; sed vide infra dub. 1. Mox post *naturae* codd. H bb adiungunt *cum eo* ac dein post *ut* cod. H addit *est*.
[9] Ita aliqui codd. ut I T Z; alii cum Vat. *associantur*. Paulo infra post *maior* pauci codd. *et* loco *vel*.
[10] Ita maior pars mss. cum ed. 1; ceteri autem *obiicias*, Vat. *obiiciatur*, quae et mox post *quod* praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. addit *dictio exclusiva*, certe supplendum.
[11] Libr. VI. de Trin., c. 9. n. 10; hic in lit. Magistri, c. 2.

and edition 1 striving against this, faultily omits *for that reason* [ideo].
[3] Here, in the text, ch. 1, where the words of (St.) Augustine are also had.
[4] On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 8, n. 9; see above in the text of Master (Peter), d. XIX, ch. 12. — A little before this, after *And* [Et], very many codices together with edition 1 add *in this manner* [sic].
[5] In codex M there is added *such* [tales].
[6] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is wanting this proposition: *Similarly: « To God the Father be the glory and to His only Son » etc.*, [Similiter: Deo Patri sit gloria eiusque soli Filio etc], which, however, is extant in all the other manuscripts and edition 1.
[7] See the explanation of these words, below, in dubium 3.
[8] The Vatican edition, together with only one or the other codex, reads *creature* [creatura]; but see below dubium 1. Next after *Nature* [naturae], codices H and bb, add *with Him* [cum eo], and then after *as* [ut], codex H adds *is* [est].
[9] Thus some codices, such as I T and Z; the others, together with the Vatican edition, have *are associated* [associantur]. A little below this after *a greater* [maior] a few codices have *and* [et] in place of *and/or* [vel].
[10] Thus the greater part of the manuscripts, together with edition 1; but all the others read *you object* [obicias]; the Vatican edition has *it is objected* [obiiciatur], which also next after *that* [quod], not trusting in the manuscripts and the six first editions, adds *an exclusive saying* [dictio exclusiva], certainly to be supplied.
[11] On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 9, n. 10, here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.

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S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXI.
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 387.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod *proprie tota Trinitas est solus Deus*, quia videtur velle negare istam: « Pater est solus Deus »; sed haec videtur esse vera per expositionem, quia Pater est Deus et non alius a Deo vel aliud: ergo etc. *Item*, praedicatum, quod dicitur de tota Trinitate, non potest esse nisi praedicatum essentiale; ergo cum *solus Deus* sit praedicatum essentiale[1] — quia aliter non diceretur de tota Trinitate — et essentiale praedicatum dicitur de qualibet persona singillatim: ergo Pater est solus Deus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quando *solus* per se additur ad praedicatum, ita quod non intelligitur a parte subiecti, improprius est sermo, sive dicatur de Trinitate tota, sive de Patre. Nec vult dicere Augustinus, quod *solus Deus* praedicetur de tota Trinitate, ita quod non de Patre. Sed in illis locutionibus: *soli Deo honor et gloria*,[2] et consimilibus *solus Deus* non accipitur pro unica persona, excludendo alias personas, sed pro tota Trinitate, excludendo alias naturas; et Magister ita accipit, ac si Augustinus vellet dicere,[3] quod hoc, scilicet *solus Deus*, *praedicaretur* de Trinitate, et non de Patre. Sed ipse vult, quod *supponat* pro ipsa Trinitate; pro Patre vero si supponat, non tamen praecise supponit pro solo Patre; et ideo Augustinus concedit, quod sola Trinitas est solus verus[4] Deus, non tamen solus Pater. Unde et Magister non dicit, quod Pater non sit solus Deus, sed quod non proprie dicitur. Et illud manifestum est, si inspiciatur, qualiter *solus* debet addi ad praedicatum.[5]

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXI
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 387.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Doubt I

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter), and first there is the doubt [dubitatur] concerning this which Master (Peter) says, that *properly the whole Trinity is the only God*, because it seems that he wants to negate this: « the Father is the only God »; but this seems to be true through the exposition, because the Father is God and not a (person) other than God and/or an other (thing): ergo etc.. *Likewise*, the predicate, which is said of the whole Trinity, cannot be but an essential predicate; therefore since *the only God* [solus Deus] is an essential predicate[1] — because otherwise it would not be said of the whole Trinity —an essential predicate is also said of each Person singly [singillatim]

I respond: It must be said, that when "*solus*" per se is added to a predicate, such that it is not understood on the part of the subject, the discourse is improper, whether it be said of the whole Trinity, or of the Father. Nor does (St.) Augustine want to say, that "*the only God*" [solus Deus] is predicated of the whole Trinity, such that (it is) not (predicated) of the Father. But in these expressions: *to God alone the honor and glory*,[2] and (those) completely similar, "*God alone*" [solus Deus] is not accepted on behalf of a unique Person, excluding the other Persons, but on behalf of the whole Trinity, excluding other natures; and Master (Peter) accepts (it) thus, and if (St.) Augustine had[3] wanted to say (this), that this, namely *the only God* [solus Deus], *it would have been predicated* of the Trinity, and not of the Father. But he does want, it to *suppose* for "the Trinity" itself; however if it supposes for "the Father", it does not precisely suppose for "the Father alone"; and for that reason (St.) Augustine

concedes, that the Trinity alone is the only, True[4] God, yet not "the Father alone". Whence also Master (Peter) does not say, that the Father is not "the only God", but that He is not properly said (to be "the only God"). And this has been made manifest, if one looks into (the matter), in what way "*solus*" ought to be added to a predicate.[5]

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Trinitatem dicimus solum Deum, quamvis semper sit cum Sanctis*, cum inseparabilis sit a rebus aliis et intimus omnibus: propter quid magis dicit[6] esse cum Sanctis quam cum aliis?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit in omnibus et cum omnibus, tamen specialiter dicitur, esse cum Sanctis propter effectum gratiae inhabitantis, per quam ipsi conformantur et cari et similes ei fiunt. Unde Proverbiorum octavo:[7] *Deliciae meae esse cum filiis hominum*, dicit Sapientia Dei. Unde *Dominus vobiscum* dicitur hominibus, non bestiis.

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this which (St. Augustine) says: *We say that the Trinity is God alone, although He is always with the Saints*, though He is inseparable from other things and most interior to all: on which account does he say[6] that He is with the Saints more than with others?

I respond: It must be said, that although God is in all and with all, yet He is said specially, to be with the Saints on account of the effect of the indwelling grace, through which they are conformed and become dear and similar to Him. Whence in the eighth (chapter) of Proverbs:[7] *My delights (are) to be with the sons of men*, says the Wisdom of God. Whence *Dominus vobiscum* ("The Lord is with you!") is said to men, not to beasts.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hac locutione: *Nemo novit Filium nisi Pater*, quia, cum nemo componatur ex *non* et *homo*, ergo nemo idem est quod *nullus homo*; sed dictio exceptiva non excipit nisi contentum sub termino.[8] Unde nihil est dictum: nullus homo currit nisi asinus. Cum ergo Pater non contineatur in suppositione huius nominis *homo*, patet etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod ampliatur ex usu distributio importata per istum terminum *nemo* ultra quam ad homines; tunc ego quaero: pro quo stat? aut pro *creato*, aut pro *increato*? Si pro *creato*, nulla est exceptio, quia simpliciter vera; et *praeterea*, Pater non est ibi contentum. Si pro *increato*, simpliciter et totaliter est[9] falsa: ergo per exceptionem non potest verificari. *Si tu dicas*, quod pro utroque; quomodo potest hoc esse, cum nihil habeant commune? Et si habent commune, aut hoc quod[10] est *nemo* distribuit pro *essentiis*, aut pro *personis*; si pro essentiis: ergo non debet excipi Pater; si pro personis: ergo debet excipi Spiritus sanctus, sicut et Pater; alioquin locutio est[11]

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of this expression: *No one* [nemo] *knows the Son but* [nisi] *the Father*, because, since "*nemo*" is composed of *not* [non] and *man* [homo], therefore "*nemo*" is the same as "*no man*" [nullus homo]; but an exceptive saying does not except but (what is) contained under the term.[8] Whence nothing is said (in this): 'no man runs except a donkey'. Therefore, since "the Father" is not contained in the supposition of this name "*man*", it is clear etc.. *If you say*, that there is amplified from use the distribution conveyed through that term "*nemo*" beyond that which regards men; Sithen I ask: on behalf of what does it stand? either on behalf of (something) *created*, or on behalf of (something) *uncreated*? If on behalf of (something) *created*, there is no exception, because (it is) simply true; and *besides*, "the Father" is not contained therein [ibi]. If on behalf of (something) *uncreated*, it is[9] simply and totally false: therefore through exception it cannot be verified. *If you say*, that (it stands) on behalf of each; in what manner can this be,

falsa.

since they have nothing common? And if they have (something) common, either that which[10] is "*nemo*" distributes on behalf of *essences*, or on behalf of *persons*; if on behalf of *essences*: therefore "the Father" ought not be excepted; if on behalf of persons: therefore the Holy Spirit ought to be excepted, just as the Father too; otherwise the expression is[11] false.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod *nemo* distribuit communiter pro omni[12] cognoscente sive habente vim cognitivam, et distribuit *nemo* non pro supposito tantum sive persona, sed pro natura. Unde Pater non excipitur, quia persona, sed quia eiusdem naturae cum Filio; et ideo implicatur in illa exceptione Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et ideo locutio habet veritatem.

I respond: It must be said, that "*nemo*" distributes commonly for every[12] (being) cognizing or having a cognitive force, and "*nemo*" distributes not only on behalf of a supposit or person, but on behalf of a nature. Whence "the Father" is not excepted, because (it is) a Person, but because (He is) of the same Nature with the Son; and for that reason "the Son" and "the Holy Spirit" are implied in that exception, and for that reason the expression has truth.

Vel dic, quod *nemo* distribuit pro hominibus,[13] et *nisi* tenetur non exceptive, sed adversative, sicut dicitur secundae ad Timotheum secundo:[14] *Ad nihil valet nisi ad subversionem audientium*.

And/or say, that "*nemo*" distributes on behalf of men,[13] and "*but*" [nisi] is not held exceptively, but adversatively, just as there is said in the second (chapter) of the Second (Letter of St. Paul) to Timothy:[14] *It prevails for nothing, but for the subversion of those hearing it*.

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[1] In Vat. et cod. cc male omittitur *ergo cum* usque *essentiale*, quae tamen verba in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habentur.
[2] I. Tim. 1, 17. — Paulo ante in cod. G post *non de Patre* additur *tantum*, ac dein cod. V pro *illis* ponit *his*.
[3] Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *non*, quod Vat. contra mentem Magistri (hic, c. 2.) addit. Mox pauci codd. ut K dd post *praedicaretur de* addiciunt *tota*, quod cod. X dein substuit pro *ipsa*.
[4] Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice *unus* loco *verus*. Paulo ante cod. X *tota* pro *sola*.
[5] Plura de hoc vide supra a. 1. q. 2. et apud Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 6.
[6] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *dicitur*.
[7] Vers. 31.
[8] Cfr. Summula Petri Hispani, Tract. de Exponibilibus.
[9] In pluribus mss. et ed. 1 omttitur *est*.
[10] Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primis edd., hic superflue addit *hoc*.
[11] Cod. V *esset*.
[12] Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 perperam *communi* pro *omni*, quae et mox praeter fidem codd. et sex primarum edd. omittit *nemo*.
[13] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. prave *omnibus* pro *hominibus*. S. Thomas hic circa lit. adducens hunc solutionis modum ait: ut sit sensus: Nullus purus homo novit Patrem notitia comprehensionis, sed tantum Filius.
[14] Vers. 14, ubi Vat. cum Vulgata *utile est* loco *valet*,

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[1] In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is badly omitted *therefore since the only God is an essential predicate* [ergo cum solus Deus sit praedicatum essentiale], which words, however, are had in the other manuscripts and in edition 1.
[2] 1 Tim. 1:17. — A little before this in codex G, after *(it is) not (predicated) of the Father* [non de Patre], there is added *only* [tantum], and then codex V for *these* [illis: in the sense of what follows], has *these* [his: in the sense of what is present].
[3] Trusting in the manuscript and edition 1 we have expunged *not* [non], which the Vatican edition adds, contrary to the mind of Master (Peter), here in ch. 2. Next a few codices, such as K and dd, after *it would be predicated of the* [praedicaretur de], add *whole* [tota], which codex X then substitutes for *Itself* [ipsa].
[4] The Vatican edition, with one or the other codex, reads *One* [unus] for *True* [verus]. A little before this codex X has *the whole Trinity* [tota Trinitas] for *the Trinity alone* [sola Trinitas].
[5] See more on this above in a. 1, q. 2, and in (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 6.
[6] The Vatican edition, contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1, has *is it said* [dicitur] for *does he say* [dicit].
[7] Verse 31.
[8] Cf. Peter of Spain, Summula, Tract on Exponibles.
[9] In very many manuscripts and edition 1, there is omitted *it is* [est].

quod exhibent codd. et ed. 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. ad 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 3. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 6.

[10] The Vatican edition, breaking with the manuscripts and the six first editions, here superfluously adds *this* [hoc].
[11] Codex V reads *would be* [esset].
[12] The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, faultily has *a common* [communi] for *every* [omni], which also next, not trusting in the codices and the six first editions, has *it* (i.e. the implied subject of the verb) for *nemo* [nemo].
[13] The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, reads erroneously *all* [omnibus] for *men* [hominibus]. St. Thomas, here on the text, adducing this manner of solution, says: that the sense is: 'None purely a man knows the Father by the knowledge of comprehension, but only the Son'.
[14] Verse 14, where the Vatican edition together with the Vulgate reads *It is useful* [utile est] for *It prevails* [valet], which the codices and edition 1 exhibit. — On this doubt, cf. above a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 65, m. 3, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.